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Security is a subject that worries most enterprises. The security threats on 
distributed systems increases. By using standards for risk management and carry 
out risk analysis, organisations can improve the quality in their systems and avoid 
occurrences of potential risks.  SINTEF has developed a model-based framework, 
CORAS, to identify and remedy security risks. The goal of the thesis is to discuss 
how good CORAS actually is and improve the parts of CORAS. 
 
We present two investigations; one involves a full security analysis of industrial 
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Chapter 1                                     
Introduction 
We become more and more surrounded by systems that help exchanging 
information and improve the communication between us. You probably use 
systems to ease your daily work and routines; you may send a couple, maybe a 
hundred e-mails every day. Perhaps you send e-mails instead of making a phone 
call, which means that more information is written down and saved. Some of the e-
mails written are confidential and could harm you or your organisation if abused. 
Information is distributed on servers and some of the information should have 
restricted access. Another example is the use of internet banking to pay bills. You 
probably do not want anyone to change your bills or payment. To prevent 
unauthorised access and change of information, access mechanisms such as login 
with user name and password are used. Organisations perform such types of actions 
to prevent security breaches. But is this a good enough method to prevent unwanted 
incidents from happening? What if an eavesdropper listens to the wire between you 
and your bank (Figure 1) when you logon, and thereby gets your login information 
and could logon to your account? Then a method that you thought was secure 
suddenly is not so secure.  
 
Figure 1 An eavesdropper sniffing your bank login information 
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In large organisations and systems it is difficult to find all potential risks. The 
explosive use of internet has increased the transmission of information, but it has 
also increased the risk of information getting in wrong hands or destroyed. The use 
of the World Wide Web has created a vulnerable market. Internet-connected 
computers in homes and companies need protection from intruders. Enterprises are 
becoming more aware of the need of security and they value the importance of 
establishing trust and confidence in their products and services. The technology 
growth increases the need for identifying risks and handling security issues. 
 
There exist several standards, guidelines and methods to manage risk in critical 
systems and organisations. They can be expensive and time-consuming and several 
are difficult to learn and understand for non experts. One method for doing risk 
analysis is CORAS1. The aim of the CORAS project was to develop a less time 
consuming and costly method. Simple models the method should be easy to 
conceive for users as well as developers. This thesis presents an evaluation of 
CORAS.  
 
This chapter starts by describing security analysis in general; which covers 
advantages for doing security analyses and constitute the basis motivation for this 
thesis. The chapter follows with the thesis problem scope and an overall overview 
of the thesis. 
1.1 Security analysis in general 
Security analysis is a special form of risk analysis focusing on security risks. It is a 
technique to identify and assess risks in a system. The goal is to prevent unexpected 
changes in revenue and costs caused by security issues in an organisation. 
Organisations perform security analysis of their systems to find potential threats 
that could harm the system. If the risk found is critical they may invest in actions to 
prevent those unwanted incidents from happening. An action could be encrypting 
the communication between the bank and the customer, thereby preventing 
eavesdroppers from stealing valuable information.     
People look at IT-security as a technical aspect, but security is more than 
technology. To find security risks it is sufficient to look at the technical part of the 
system. The environmental issues are as well important.  
 
There will now be described the basic procedures of a risk analysis that also applies 
for a security analysis. A risk analysis should be conducted as part of the business 
process in an organisation. It would help the organisation to find threats, 
vulnerabilities, to achieve good design and improve product quality. When 
performing risk analysis the risk management professionals meet the organisation 
in order to identify needs and get a common understanding of the target. The risk 
                                                 
1
 CORAS is introduced in Chapter 2 
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analysis team, compounded by organisation experts and the analysis professional, 
follows a structured method to identify risks. There exist several available risk 
analysis methods. Regardless of what method is used, the steps are approximately 
the same [14]: 
 
1. Asset identification: Identify what is of value and relevance in the 
organisation and in the analysis target. 
2. Risk identification: Identify threats, risk, concerns and vulnerabilities to the 
assets found. 
3. Prioritise the risk: Estimate the risk. Assign consequence and frequency 
values to the identified risk.  
4. Evaluate risks: Consider which risks to be treated. The risk level is decided 
from the consequence and frequency values estimated. 
5. Treat, monitor and control the risks: Suggest how to treat, monitor or control 
the risks that were prioritised. 
 
In a risk analysis with focus on security the key elements in each step are 
confidentiality, integrity and availability. There are many different styles and types 
of risk analysis, but there are generally two major categories: qualitative and 
quantitative risk analysis. Qualitative risk analyses do not attempt to assign numeric 
values to the risk analysis components. Quantitative risk analyses do attempt to 
assign objective numeric values to the component and to the level of potential 
losses. [14]  
 
CORAS is a model-based security analysis method. The motivation and advantages 
for performing model-based security analysis are rendered from [15] and illustrated 
in Figure 2. In the long-term, correctly and systematically use of model-based 
security analysis will lead to reduced costs; increasing reuse of documentation will 
lead to reduce in maintenance cost, early identification of risks will prevent loss of 
assets value. Use of model-based security analysis will help the design team 
through the process of building secure and good systems. The use of graphical 
models will improve the communication between different parts involved and will 
lead to a correct understanding of the target. Security analyses also have methods 
that will help teams to prioritise and manage risks and prepare them for the 
occurrences of unwanted incidents.    
 
 
Introduction  4                                                                                                                                                 
  
 
Figure 2 Motivation and advantages of model-based security analysis [15] 
 
1.2 The problem scope 
This section discusses some of the issues with CORAS that require research. Some 
of the questions asked are investigated in this thesis. 
 
The aim of this thesis was to evaluate and improve the CORAS framework for 
model-based risk analysis (MBRA). The scope of the CORAS framework is wide 
and there are still problems relating to it that require evaluation and testing. This 
thesis is part of a long process of evaluating CORAS’ usability. CORAS has 
already been successfully tested in several organisations, but still needs 
improvement. In order to conclude whether CORAS is a success or not the testing 
will continue. The research and further development and improvement will carry on 
after this thesis is finished. The overall goal for the CORAS project is to assess 
whether CORAS is appropriate for the intended market. One way to do this is to try 
CORAS out in different organisations and evaluate the result.  
 
CORAS intend to bring the security of systems to a higher level. What level 
determines if a system is secure or not? There are different opinions about what a 
secure system is; a security expert desires a system with high security, a customer 
wants a secure but a usable and functional system. Before performing a security 
analysis it is important to determine for whom the analysis is carried out, the 
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analysis viewpoint2. The viewpoint decides what direction the rest of the analysis 
takes. CORAS emphasises the importance of focusing on the analysis viewpoint.  
The challenge is to make the CORAS customer decide the level of security and the 
system intention of relevance for the analysis. The main issue is whether CORAS 
satisfies the customer’s security expectations on the desired level of security. 
 
A security analysis could be performed in different phases of the development 
process. When is it reasonable to perform a security analysis? Focus on security 
before, during and after the system development process (see Figure 33). Would it 




Figure 3 Example of the system development process 
 
An important characteristic of CORAS is the use of models and diagrams. Together 
with UML (unified modelling language) [5] CORAS uses an own developed 
graphical language to describe the analysis object. One intention is to improve the 
communication between the parts in the analysis process. The issue is if these 
models achieve good target descriptions? Do these models give a satisfying 
description? How to improve the models? Will the models improve the 
communication among the team participants? 
 
Assume the research concludes that CORAS works as intended. The results are 
good and it is proved to be a worthy methodology. This is of course significant, but 
what if the need for the methodology does not exist? If there is no need for such a 
methodology, is the research work futile then? This leads to another problem scope; 
                                                 
2
 A viewpoint could e.g. be the organizations customer or the organization itself. 
3
 This figure is a typical development process and could not be referred from a particular place.  
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to find out the need and motivation for IT-security standards among organisations. 
Is there a need for such methods? Will they be used? Maybe the use of such 
standards become to expensive.  
CORAS is based on several IT-security standards. Are the IT-security standards 
CORAS is based on the same as the IT-security standards used in practice? 
 
These issues are only a few of what need to be answer before concluding whether 
CORAS’ usability is applicable. This thesis will concern two fields: 
 
 The CORAS framework: Try to answer some of the problems of CORAS and 
thereby improve the framework.  
 CORAS according to IT-security standards: Investigate if there is a need for 
such a framework among organisations and if the IT-security standards used 
are the same as the IT-security standards CORAS is based on. 
1.3 Overview of evaluation 
The previous section identified the two aspects of CORAS being investigated by 
this thesis; an evaluation of the CORAS framework and evaluation of the use of IT-
security standards among organisations.  
 
To explain the relation between IT-security standards and CORAS an illustration is 
presented in Figure 4. The intention of CORAS is to offer a good risk analysis 
method to be used on security critical systems in organisations. The relation 
between CORAS and IT-security standards is that the CORAS framework is based 
on known IT-security standards, thus CORAS may have much in common with 




Figure 4 CORAS relations 
 
The work comprises two investigations. In order to evaluate the CORAS 
framework CORAS was used in an organisation. To evaluate CORAS according to 
IT-security standards there was performed a survey among different organisations. 
The following presents an overview of the two areas of evaluation that lead to the 
result of this thesis. 
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1.3.1 CORAS field trial in Agresso 
The aim of this field trial was to find strengths and weaknesses in the CORAS 
framework. The framework is large and a complete research will take many years, 
thus this evaluation only concerns some parts of the framework. The CORAS 
framework parts investigated were the CORAS UML profile, the CORAS tool and 
the CORAS risk management process (referred to as CORAS RMP). 
 
In order to investigate the parts of CORAS, CORAS was tested in a real system 
and. The CORAS RMP was used to perform a risk analysis in this case referred to 
as security analysis.  
 
The security analysis was performed in the Agresso R&D organisation (refereed to 
as Agresso). Agresso develops a system, Agresso Business World (ABW). The 
analysis was carried out on a small functionality in ABW, the AGRESSO 
PunchOut Functionality (AGRESSO POF). This part of ABW is interesting from a 
security perspective because it reaches out to external systems over the internet. 
1.3.2 CORAS according to IT-security standards 
CORAS is based on several IT-security standards. By finding organisations use of 
IT-security standards it would probably cover the need for CORAS. The purpose of 
the survey was to see if the standards used in practice are the same CORAS is 
based on, and cover organisations use IT-security standards.  
 
In order to investigate organisations use of IT-security standards there were 
accomplished a survey among different organisations. A questionnaire was handed 
out to twenty different organisations. The questionnaire had questions about well–
known standards as ISO 27001 (formerly BS 7799) and ISO 17799 and questions 
about organisations’ future use and interest in IT-security standards. 
The purpose of investigation was to establish the use of IT-security standards 
among organisations to declare whether the IT-security standards in use (or used) 
are the same as the IT-security standards CORAS is based on. Another purpose was 
to cover organisations intention of using IT-security standards in the future. 
1.4 Reading guideline 
This section presents the thesis structure. It is meant as a help to the reader and 
summarises the main points from each chapter and explains the relations of the 
chapter. Figure 5 gives a graphical presentation of the structure. 
 











CORAS field trial in 
Agresso
Chapter 7:


















Figure 5 Reading structure 
 
CHAPTER 1 Introduction:  Establishes and motivates the research purpose. It 
explains the security analysis concept, describes the problem scope and presents the 
research performed that constitutes the basis of the evaluation.  
  
CHAPTER 2 CORAS background: Gives an introduction to CORAS. It provides 
background information of CORAS, including the overall CORAS framework, 
history and goals and the CORAS risk management process. 
  
CHAPTER 3 The thesis success criteria: This chapter presents the thesis success 
criteria that used in Chapter 8 to discuss the evaluation of the result in Chapter 6 
and Chapter 7. The goal of the thesis is to answer these success criteria.   
 
CHAPTER 4 The Research strategy:  Provides a description of the research 
strategy followed during the study. The chapter gives an explanation of well–
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known research methods and strategies that creates the background for the choice 
of research strategy.  
 
CHAPTER 5: Hypotheses for the evaluation of CORAS: Formulates the hypotheses 
used for evaluation of the results (in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) gathered during 
research.  
 
CHAPTER 6 CORAS field trial in Agresso: Presents the results acquired during the 
security analysis performed in Agresso. The results are evaluated according to the 
hypotheses defined in Chapter 5.1. The analysis report is given in Appendix D. 
 
CHAPTER 7 CORAS according to other IT-security standards:  Gives the result of 
twenty different organisations’ answers to questionnaires handed out. The results 
are evaluated with the hypotheses in Chapter 5.2.    
 
CHAPTER 8 Discussion: Based on the thesis success criteria in Chapter 3 it 
discusses whether the aim of the thesis is achieved. An appreciation of the 
evaluation performed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are considered.   
 
CHAPTER 9 Further work: Modifications are suggested and work is recommended 
in order to continue the research.  
 
CHAPTER 10 Conclusion: Summarises and concludes the accomplishment and 
findings.  
 
APPENDIX A: Contains the questionnaires and interview used in the Agresso field 
trial. 
 
APPENDIX B: Contains the questionnaire used for the IT-security standard 
investigation. 
 
APPENDIX C: Introduce the CORAS UML profile. 
 
APPENDIX D: Presents the security analysis report. For security reasons some of 
the risks and information has been removed or hidden behind black boxes.
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Chapter 2                                                 
CORAS Background 
CORAS is a method for doing risk assessment of security–critical systems. The 
purpose of CORAS is to help integrate security into system development. One of 
the main objectives of CORAS is to develop a practical framework to support and 
simplify risk management. The framework includes an experience library from 
previous projects, the methodology for doing risk assessment and a terminology to 
use in the projects.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader enough background information to 
understand the framework. Unless otherwise stated the information is restated from 
[1]. 
2.1 CORAS history and goals 
The CORAS project started in January 2001, and in September 2003 the first 
version of the framework results was released. The EU-funded project CORAS was 
terminated in 2003 and is now a part of the SECURIS project. The first version was 
created in an EU- project. The CORAS consortium consisted of eleven institutions 
from European countries. The later versions have been developed by SINTEF 
among other projects like SECURIS [6], TrustCoM, ENFORCE [4]. At present 
SINTEF is in charge of the development of CORAS.  
 
During the past years CORAS has been tried out on different organisations. The 
result of these field trials has been evaluated and used to improve the framework. It 
has been tested in telemedicine and e-commerce systems with success.  
  
The main goal of CORAS is to create a model-based methodology that is able to 
detect all types of risks in an environment, an improved method for precise, 
unambiguous and efficient risk analysis of security critical IT systems. The use of 
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models will give a structured overview of the system and detect more risks. The 
goal is to use models comprehensible for all parts involved. 
The aim of developing CORAS was to establish a method to maintain security in 
systems and to create a cost-effective risk assessment process. Not only the 
technical security has been emphasized; the organisational and business context 
was equally important [4]. When organisations worry about security, they tend to 
focus primarily on the technical security issues. Several organisations are not aware 
of the frequently security breaches caused by the organisations environment4. 
Hence there is a need for building structured methods to handle both technical and 
organisations environmental security issues. CORAS covers both technical and 
organisations environmental vulnerabilities. 
2.2 The CORAS framework 
This chapter describes the results of CORAS. The CORAS framework is based on 
the Reference Model for Open Distributing Processing (RM-ODP) [20]. RM-ODP 
has an object-oriented foundation and defines concepts and structuring rules for 
describing the architecture of distributed systems.  
 
The framework (Figure 6) gives the overall structure of the CORAS three main 
results. It supports the risk analysis team when doing the risk analysis by providing 
a terminology, a methodology and a library to use. The use of the CORAS 
framework is a complex process that involves both humans and tools [3]. 
Therefore, a tool has been developed to support the framework.  
 
 
Figure 6 Overview of the CORAS framework 
 
The following sections explain the three results of the CORAS framework and the 
results role in an analysis process. 
                                                 
4
 Security breaches caused by the environment could be human threats e.g. an employee leaving the 
door to the organisation open or writes down the password on his computer.   
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2.2.1 The CORAS methodology 
The methodology consists of a tool, guidelines for doing the risk management and 
languages used to support the different activities in the risk management process. 
An overview of the methodology result is given in Figure 7.  
The MBRA methodology involves a platform for tool integration, a risk 
management process (introduced in Section 2.4) and a system development process 
(CORAS IRM-SDP, integrated risk management and system development process), 
and languages (XML, UML etc.) for representing security assessment information. 
 
 
Figure 7 Overview the CORAS methodology 
 
As mentioned the CORAS framework is provided with an integrated tool. The tool 
is used to simplify and easily document the analysis process. It is an open source 
product and can be downloaded from http://coras.sourceforge.net. In the current 
version of CORAS, there is both a web based tool and a desktop-based tool. In 
Figure 8 shows the desktop-based tool, consisting of: 
 
 A library of reusable experience packages 
 The risk analysis project engaged 
 A tutorial of the CORAS methodology with description of the tools function.  
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Figure 8 The CORAS risk analysis tool 
 
The language supports the risk analysis process. CORAS suggest using known 
languages (e.g. UML and XML). In addition, a CORAS’ specific graphical 
language has been devised. The CORAS graphical language is explained in more 
detailed in Appendix C.  
The intention of a graphical language is to facilitate communication and 
interaction between different groups of stakeholders involved in a security 
assessment. The focuses of CORAS are good documentation, analysis, maintenance 
and reporting. It is believed that the use of such graphical language with belonging 
description creates good documentation. 
There are three important purposes to use models when doing a risk assessment: 
 
 Describe the target of evaluation at the right level of abstraction 
 To simplify the communication between the different participants involved 
 Document the risk assessment result to support reuse and maintenance   
2.2.2 The CORAS library  
During a risk analysis there will be several risks identified. These risks may have 
been identified in earlier cases or there could be risks that have much in common. 
To avoid doing the same process a number of times, one will probably save a lot of 
work by storing the analysis results in a library. It saves time and avoids mistakes 
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and erroneous decisions. The CORAS reusable elements repository (RER) is 
designed to facilitate reuse of experiences from risk assessments. The library is 
among other based on standards such as UML, XML and XSL. 
 
There are two libraries in the CORAS framework: 
 
 The experience library: Supports the risk assessment process by providing 
general reusable elements. 
 The assessment library: Stores elements from actual risk assessment.   
 
The libraries are used by the risk analysis team to assist in the risk assessment 
process. The advantage of the libraries is firstly to the facilities of reuse (the user 
avoids starting from scratch), secondly to document the risk assessment.   
2.2.3 The CORAS terminology  
The terminology defines central terms and their relationships in the framework.  
The CORAS terminology is divided into three parts; security terminology (related 
to IT-security), RM-ODP terminology and risk analysis terminology. The concepts 
of security and risk analysis are taken from several international standards like 
AS/NZS 4360 (the remaining standards are listed in Table 8). Some of the terms 
are defined in the next section (2.3). The purpose of defining terminology is to 
clarify confusing or misunderstood terms among participants in a security analysis.  
2.3 CORAS definitions 
This section presents relevant security and risk terms. The definitions are a part of 
the CORAS framework as described in section 2.2. Only terms necessary for this 
thesis will be defined.   
2.3.1 Security definitions 
This section presents the general security terms defined in the CORAS 
terminology.  
 
 IT-security: All aspects related to defining, achieving, and maintaining 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, accountability, 
authenticity, and reliability. 
 Availability: The property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an 
authorised entity. 
 Confidentiality: The property that information is not made available or 
disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes. 
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 Data Integrity: The property that data has not been altered or destroyed in an 
unauthorised manner.  
 Non-repudiation: The ability to prove an action or event has taken place, so 
that this event or action cannot be repudiated later. (In message based 
communication protocols non-repudiation provides proof of expedition or 
receipt, so that it shall be impossible to falsely claim not having sent or 
received a digital message.) (In general non repudiation can be seen as a 
special case of accountability). 
 Accountability: The property that ensures that the actions of an entity may be 
traced uniquely to the entity.  
 Authenticity: The property that ensures that the identity of a subject or 
resource is the one claimed. Authenticity applies to entities such as users, 
processes, systems and information.  
 Reliability: The property of consistent intended behaviour and results. 
2.3.2 Risk analysis definitions 
This section presents risk analysis terms used during a risk management process 
with CORAS. The terms are taken from the CORAS terminology.  
 
 Assets: Something to which an organisation directly assigns value and, hence, 
for which the organisation requires protection. 
 Consequence: The outcome of an event expressed qualitatively or 
quantitatively, being a loss, injury, disadvantage or gain. There may be a 
range of possible outcomes associated with an event 
 Frequency: A measure of the rate of occurrence of an event expressed as the 
number of occurrences of an event in a given time. See also Likelihood and 
Probability.  
 HazOp (Hazard and operability study): A technique for identifying and 
analysing the hazards and operational concerns of a system [11]. 
 Risk: The chance of something happening that will have an impact upon 
objectives. It is measured in terms of consequence and likelihood.  
 Risk Analysis: A systematic use of available information to determine how 
often specified events may occur and the magnitude of their consequences.  
 Risk Assessment: The overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation.  
 Risk Identification: The process of determining what can happen, why and 
how.  
 Risk Management: The culture, processes and structures that are directed 
towards effective management of potential opportunities and adverse effects.  
 Risk Management Process: The systematic application of management 
policies, procedures a practice to the tasks of establishing the context, 
identifying, and analysing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and 
communicating risk. 
 Risk Treatment: Selection and implementation of appropriate options for 
dealing with risk.  
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 Stakeholders: Those people and organisations who may affect, be affected 
by, or perceive themselves to be affected by, a decision or activity. 
 Target of Evaluation (TOE): an IT product or system and its associated 
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an 
evaluation 
 Threat identification: Valuable information on potential threats can be 
gathered by the review of attack-alerts logged by intrusion detection tools. 
These logs provide a source of information on security incidents that posed a 
threat to the system security in the past. 
 Unwanted incident: incident such as loss of confidentiality, integrity and/or 
availability. 
 Vulnerability identification: The main results of vulnerability assessment 
tools are the identification of the known vulnerabilities associated to the 
current versions of the operating systems and services. 
 













Figure 9 CORAS elements 
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2.3.3 IT-security standard definitions 
CORAS is based on several IT-security and risk management standards. Below 
defines the IT-security standards CORAS is based on.  
 
 AS/NZS 4360: Australian / New Zealand Standard for Risk Management. 
This Standard provides a generic guide for managing risk [16] 
 ISO 13335: IT security management – comprises a set of guidelines for the 
management of IT security, focusing primarily on technical security control 
measures [17] 
 ISO 17799 (ISO 27001): This is the Code of Practice describing a 
comprehensive set of information security control objectives and outlines a 
menu of best-practice security controls [18] 
 IEC 61508:  Is the international standard for electrical, electronic and 
programmable electronic safety related systems. It sets out the requirements 
for ensuring that systems are designed, implemented, operated and 
maintained to provide the required safety integrity level (SIL) [19] 
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2.4 A short introduction to the CORAS risk 
management process (RMP) 
To find potential threats in a system the CORAS risk management process defines 
five sub-processes. The five sub-processes each have several activities. As stated in 
Figure 10, each step could be reviewed if necessary. It is important that the analysis 








































Figure 10 Overview of the CORAS process 
 
 
It is not mandatory to follow the full guideline. It is up to the risk analyst leader to 
decide the necessary activities to follow. This section gives a short tutorial on the 
process of a security analysis based on the CORAS methodology. The information 
is gathered from the CORAS platform tool. 
CORAS Background  20                                                                                                                                                                   
  
2.4.1 Context identification 
The goal of the context identification process is to establish an understanding of 
what to evaluate. It is important to find the stakeholders5 motive and goal with the 
analysis. What do the stakeholders want to protect? The context identification 
process sets the stage for the rest of the process. It is important to understand the 
exact target of analysis, in order to find potential risks. Table 1 gives the activities 
to do in order to achieve the intention of this sub-process.  
 
Activity Description 
Identify areas of relevance Provide a correct and complete description of 
the target of evaluation and its related areas of 
relevance. It is divided into five sub-activities; 
risk management context, organisational context, 
SWOT analysis, documentation and target of 
evaluation. 
Identify and value assets Identify the assets relevant to the target of 
evaluation. The assets make the focus for the 
rest of the analysis.  
Identify risk evaluation criteria Give an estimate of the loss in assets a client can 
tolerate over a given time. 
Approval Ensure that the documentation from the previous 
steps is correct and complete. 
Table 1 Main activities in the context identification sub-process 
2.4.2 Risk identification 
This activity suggests methods to identify potential threats and vulnerabilities 
pursuant to the analysis target described in the context identification. The threats 
and vulnerabilities may be found through structured brainstorming methods (e.g. 
Hazard and operability analysis) and questionnaires. The process involves a team of 
security experts, system owners, system developers and risk analysis experts. The 




Identify threats to assets Makes use of selected techniques and fragments 
from conventional risk analysis methods. Use 
these methods to identify which threats that 
could lead to loss in the assets (the assets found 
in the context identification sub-process). 
                                                 
5
 It could be one or several stakeholders attach to an analysis 
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Activity Description 
Identify vulnerabilities of assets Identify vulnerabilities of assets by using 
questionnaires.  
Document unwanted incidents Combine and structure the results from previous 
steps and decide whether further threats or 
vulnerabilities identifications are needed.   
Table 2 Main activities in the risk identification sub-process 
2.4.3 Risk estimation 
This sub-process estimates the risk found in the risk identification sub-process. The 
analysis team assigns the risks consequences and frequency values. The sub-
process is divided into three activities explained in Table 3.  
 
Activity Description 
Consequence evaluation Analyse, evaluate and document the 
consequences of the unwanted incidents.  
Frequency evaluation Come up with realistic estimates for the 
probabilities that for each specific unwanted 
incident to occur.  
Determine level of risk 
estimation 
For each unwanted incident to combine the 
consequence value and frequency value into an 
estimate for the level of the risk.  
Table 3 Main activities in the risk estimation sub-process 
2.4.4 Risk evaluation 
This sub-process evaluates the risks to find what risks that need treatment. The sub-
activities are explained in Table 4. 
 
Activity Description 
Prioritise risks Priorities each risk. Decide whether the risk 
should be accepted or not and sort the risk by 
priority. 
Classify risks into categories Identify the risk categories to be applied and 
document them. Assign the risk that has not 
been accepted to its appropriate category. 
Prioritise the risk categories Assign the risk category values. For each risk 
theme calculate an overall risk value and assign 
a risk category priority. Document the result in a 
risk value table. 
Table 4 Main activities in the risk evaluation sub-process 
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2.4.5 Risk treatment 
The last sub-process is the risk treatment. Based on the evaluation done in the 
previous activity there were suggest treatment to the risk that was decided to treat. 
The activities of this step are explained in Table 5.  
 
Activity Description 
Identify treatment options Assign one or several treatment options for each 
risk category and document and illustrate the 
treatment options. 
Assess alternative treatment     
approaches 
Do a cost and benefit analysis and prioritise for 
each treatment option.  
Table 5 Main activity in the risk treatment process 
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Chapter 3                                                
The thesis success criteria 
The purpose of this thesis was to further investigate the CORAS framework in 
order to improve the different parts of the framework such as the tool, the CORAS 
UML profile and CORAS RMP. The approach was to bring the research of 
CORAS to the next level. The expectation was to be able to accomplish an analysis 
in an organisation, and perform a survey among organisations to state the 
organisations need and use of IT-security standards.  
 
In order to limit the research thesis success criteria were established. The goal of 
this thesis is to be able to answer the thesis success criteria. To further answer the 
success criteria there were established hypotheses in each investigation part (given 
in Chapter 5).  
 
The thesis success criteria are the superior hypotheses based on the evaluation of 
the CORAS’s framework and CORAS according to IT-security standards. The 
success criteria are used for discussion in Chapter 8 and are used to evaluate 
whether this research validate the hypotheses.   
 
THE THESIS SUCCESS CRITERIA: 
 The field trial in Agresso is successful if we are able to evaluate CORAS with 
respect to whether: 
o The CORAS UML profile supports and simplifies the analysis 
process  
o The CORAS tool increases the quality and efficiency of an analysis  
o Use of the CORAS RMP improves the quality of the organisations’ 
system 
 The IT-security standard survey is successful if we are able to evaluate 
whether:  
o CORAS is based on the standards most commonly used in practice  
o There is an increasing use and need for IT-security standards 
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Chapter 4                                  
Research strategy 
This chapter motivates and present the thesis research strategy. It describes the 
research progress from beginning to end; how the research strategy was chosen, 
planning of the research and collecting results.   
 
The aim of research is arrive at something new, either a new theory or a new 
artefact. When doing research, the goal is to produce a solution to an unsolved 
problem. It is common to distinguish between two types of research, classic 
research and technology research. The classic research tries to find a solution to a 
problem related to the structure of the real world. Technology research is research 
trying to construct new and better artefacts (human created entities). In both cases, 
hypotheses are either verified or falsified. The hypotheses evaluation may result in 
a new design which is checked against the specification of the artefact to evaluate 
the quality. 
 
Since this thesis was concerned with evaluating and recommending improvements 
to an artefact (CORAS), the thesis belongs to the area of technology research. 
 
When performing technology research several research strategies are available. 
Each strategy has different strengths and weaknesses.  
 
Section 4.1introduces the basic research strategies and methods available which 
establish a basis for the choice of research strategy. Section 4.2 present an overview 
of the choice and Section 4.3 describes how the research was performed. Unless 
otherwise stated the information about research methods is gathered from [9]. 
4.1 Research methods 
A research method is a method for developing and finding the evidence of research 
hypotheses. The difference between strategy and method may be confusing; a 
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research strategy is a description of the entire process of finding an answer to the 
research problem, a recipe on how to complete our research. A method could be a 
step in the process of finding those answers. Several methods can be used during 
the research strategy. There are several different research methods, and it is not 
always easy to distinguish between them.  
 
The following section is present the methods that constitute the basis for our choice 
of research strategy.  
4.1.1 Technology research 
Technology research is about constructing new and better artefacts. With 
technology research, you carry out a problem analysis and a specification of the 
artefact. Next, you create a new design of the artefact specification. Then you find 
evidence to back up your design. The purpose of technology research is to find out 
if the design satisfies the specification.   
4.1.2 Action research 
There are different forms of action research. Since the mid-twentieth century, the 
action research has been used in social and medical science. Now the method is 
also used in the science of information systems. The researchers’ task is to analyse 
both the subjects (e.g. elements in an environment) and the social situation in the 
research environments.  
 
Action research has its root in social and psychological science. Hence, it is 
important to understand the complexity of social organisation in the problem. The 
researcher and the client operate together. The goal of the researcher and the client 
must not deviate significantly. An action researcher will as part of the research not 
just observe, but be actively involved within the research. This way of working will 
provide benefits for both the researcher and the organisation.  
 
The action research approach is to implement change and study the changes.  A key 
assumption of the action researcher is that the result of splitting the organisation 
and the technology into smaller pieces will not lead to useful information about the 
situation.  
 
One form of action research, known as the “participatory action research”, is the 
five-step model [10]. It requires the establishment of a client-system infrastructure 
or a research environment. This is the environment where the researcher has 
authority or sanction to specify actions. It includes boundaries of the research 
domain, the entries and exits of the scientists. The five phases are: 
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1. Diagnosing: Identifying the primary problems that are the underlying causes of 
the organisation’s desire for change. 
2. Action planning: Specification of organisational actions that should relieve or 
improve these primary problems. These planned actions are about discovering 
some desired future state for the organisation and the changes that would 
achieve such a state. 
3. Action taking: Implement the planned actions. The researcher and the 
practitioners collaborate.  
4. Evaluating: Evaluating the outcome of the completed actions. Where the 
change was successful, the evaluation must critically question, what is the 
reason for success? If the change was unsuccessful, it should be established a 
framework (make change to elicit a better result) for the next iteration of the 
action research cycle. 
5. Specifying learning: The last phase is to specify the knowledge gained during 
the process. It is about learning something for further use in research. 
 
The five phases may be cycled. Not only if it was a success, but also to develop 
further knowledge about the organisation and the validity of relevant theoretical 
frameworks. [10] 
4.1.3 Empirical method 
The four research methods used in software engineering are the scientific method, 
the engineering method, the empirical method and the analytical method [1]. A 
closer look at empirical method is now presented. 
 
Empirical method is based on empirical studies. As for action research, the 
empirical studies come from social science and psychology. In these studies, 
human behaviour is of importance. Software engineering has non-formal rules and 
laws because of human behaviour and it cannot expect to find any formal rules 
because people develop the software. Empirical methods include the investigation 
techniques survey, case study and experiments.  
 
Survey is an investigation technique that primary uses interviews and 
questionnaires to gather information. Surveys are used before a tool is used or when 
a tool has been used for a while. It could be appropriate to use surveys to study how 
a new development process has improved the developers’ attitude towards quality 
assurance. For example when we are interested in finding out what people think 
about a tool/product. The purpose is to understand the opinions of the population. 
What is the general opinion of the product?  The objectives when conducting 
surveys are descriptive, explanatory and explorative [9].  
 
Case studies are studies observing or monitoring projects, activities or assignments. 
With case studies, we are investigating an entity or phenomenon for a period. When 
doing case studies we are looking at the changes with respect to an existing design 
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or a specification, to see the differences. It is appropriate when finding out which 
entity is best or evaluating the differences between two methods. It can be viewed 
as a comparative research strategy, by comparing one method in one approach with 
the same method used in another approach [6].  
 
Experiments are normally done in a laboratory environment. While doing 
experiments the variables are manipulated and controlled. The difference in 
experiments and case studies are that in experiments the situation is controlled by 
manipulating state variables, but in case studies changes are applied and the effects 
are observed. Experiments are appropriate in various situations i.e. testing whether 
the accuracy of certain models is as expected, testing existing theories, testing 
people conceptions, exploring relationships, and validating measures [9].  
 
Carrying out experiments involves different steps as definition, planning, operation, 
analysis, interpretation, presentation and package [9].  
4.2 The choice of research strategy 
When doing research we need a strategy for how to proceed. The following explain 
the relations between the methods and strategies used in the thesis research.  
 
 
Figure 11 Relations between research methods and strategies 
 
This study is dealing with an artefact (CORAS) which means that it falls into the 
category technology research. As illustrated in Figure 11 action research has its root 
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in classic research because it was first used in social and medical science 
(researches in the real world). Because of its focus in humans, their behaviour and 
the close collaboration between humans, it is still related to classic research. In 
action research the researcher will be actively involved in the research object. 
During this research there we were not actively involved in CORAS, thus this was 
not action research. The research strategy inherits some ideas from action research 
because there were followed some of the phases described in Section 4.1.2.  
The empiric methods are frequently used in both technology research and 
classical research. This requires specific methods and techniques to collect results.  
4.3 Carrying out the CORAS research 
This section describes the thesis research process. The use of empiric methods was 
chosen. The introduction chapter presented two investigations of evaluation, the 
evaluation of the parts in the CORAS framework and the CORAS according to IT-
security standards. Below is a presentation of how the research of these two areas 
was accomplished.  
 
An overview of the research strategy is in Figure 12. The figure presents the relation 
between the research phases. The four phases are: 
 
1. Problem analysis:  The problem analysis specifies the research of CORAS 
which includes; the two research investigations, the decided research methods 
to use, and the formulated hypotheses. The hypotheses were categorised into 
hypotheses related to the CORAS framework (Section 5.1) and hypotheses 
related to CORAS according to IT-security standards (Section 5.2).  
2. Plan of research:  This phase planned the accomplishment of the research. 
The planning implied deciding how to test the hypotheses formulated in the 
problem analysis and how to gather evidences (results). In order to collect 
necessary results two investigations were planned; Using CORAS in an 
organisation, and perform an IT-security standard survey among organisation.   
3. Accomplish the research: In this phase the planned investigations were 
accomplished. Evidences were collected during the accomplishment of both 
investigations. 
4. Evaluate the results: This phase compared the results collected from the 
investigations to the hypotheses stated during the problem analysis.  
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Figure 12 Overview of research strategy 
 
 
The following gives a more detailed description of each research phase. 
4.3.1 The problem analysis 
The research started by creating the problem analysis. This section presents the 
research investigation, the research technique and the research methods from the 
problem analysis. 
4.3.1.1 The research investigation 
The first step of this research was to define what to investigate within CORAS. 
What need change? What do we want to achieve with the research?  
The goal of this analysis was to continue the CORAS research and find possible 
weaknesses with the design that require change.  Based on the CORAS requirement 
specification [8] it was decided to investigate three parts of the CORAS framework. 
Another point of interest that required investigation was finding out organisations 
need for CORAS. CORAS is based on well known IT-security standards. Thus to 
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investigate the organisations knowledge of IT-security standards and their use of 
such standards if relevant would be useful.  
 
The problem analysis resulted in two research investigations:  
 
 The CORAS framework: The CORAS framework needed testing and 
improvement. The parts of the framework was: 
o The CORAS UML profile 
o The CORAS risk management  process 
o The CORAS risk analysis tool 
 CORAS according to IT-security standards: To find out about the use of IT-
security standards among organisations in order to answer some questions 
about CORAS: 
o Do organisations need CORAS? 
o Is CORAS based on the same standards as those used in practice? 
 
4.3.1.2 Evaluation technique  
The previous section defined what research investigation parts to evaluate. For both 
of the investigations a number of hypotheses were formulated. The purpose of 
formulating hypotheses was to investigate them empirically. The hypotheses are 
given in Chapter 5. 
4.3.1.3 Research methods 
There exist several investigation techniques on how to collect evidence during 
research. The following were chosen:  
 
 Observations: Through experience and observations the analyst leader 
collected results from learning the methodology and the tool, using the UML 
profile and from the analysis process itself.  
 Questionnaires: Data were collected from the analysis team. There two 
questionnaires were completed among the team. 
 Interviews: During the analysis, interviews were performed among some of 
the team members.  
 
The results are presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.  
4.3.2 Plan of research 
The problem analysis defined the research investigation, the evaluation technique 
to use and research methods used when collecting evidence. The next phase in the 
research was to plan how results collection should be accomplished. Based on the 
two research investigations, two investigations were planned:  
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 Use of CORAS in an organisation: In order to investigate the parts of 
CORAS’s framework the plan was to use the parts of the framework in an 
organisation. Questionnaire, interviews and observations were used during 
the investigation. 
 Perform a survey among organisations: The purpose of this investigation was 
to map organisations use and need of IT-security standards. Questionnaire 
was handed out to several organisations. 
4.3.3 Accomplish the research 
In order to accomplish the plan it required one organisation willing to perform a 
security analysis and several organisations to answer the IT-security standard 
survey.  Below is a presentation of how the two investigations were completed.  
4.3.3.1 First investigation: CORAS field trial in Agresso 
The purpose of this field trial was to answer some of the problems with the CORAS 
UML profile, the CORAS RMP and the CORAS tool. In order to investigate these 
parts of the framework the CORAS RMP was used to execute a security analysis in 
the Agresso organisation. The analysis focused on a small functionality in their 
system, the AGRESSO POF.  
 
An overview of the field trial is given in Figure 13. The CORAS RMP included use 
of the CORAS UML profile and use the CORAS tool to store the results and as a 
guide during the process. The analysis closed with generating an analysis report. 
Evidences were collected by gather information form the analysis participants, and 
trough the analysts observations and monitoring of the different parts in the 
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Figure 13 Overview of the first investigation 
 
 
Figure 14 displays milestones for the Agresso field trial. Carrying out an analysis 
require preparation was the analyst leader’s first analysis. It implied that the leader 
had to learn the CORAS methodology and the tool before perform the analysis. 
Accomplishing the analysis involves deciding when and how to perform it and 
compose a team to participate during the analysis meetings. Finally write an 
analysis report. 
   
 
Figure 14 Milestones of the first investigation 
 
Research strategy  34                                                                                      
  




Jenny B. Hougen Analyst leader 
Tor Gaute Indstøy Security expert, system designer,  analysis secretary 
Erik Inge Marcussen Developer, AGRESSO framework expert 
Randi Bjørnbeth System designer 
Truls Tveøy System designer, developer 
Helge T. Blindheim Customer view 
Table 6 Roles and responsibilities among the analysis team 
 
During the analysis process there several surveys were carried out. Table 7 gives an 
overview of how and when we collected the results from the team members. 
 
 
Action type Date Participant Description 
Questionnaire 
1 




Tveøy, Helge T. 
Blindheim 
The questionnaire was 
performed after the first 
analysis meeting with all 
the participants. The 
results from this 









The questionnaire was 
performed after the last 
analysis meeting and the 
results are given in 
Appendix A.3 
Interview 15.03.2006 Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
Truls Tveøy 
There were carried out a 
interview on two of the 
participants. The 
questions from the 
interview are given in 
Appendix A.2 
Observation 24.01.2006 – 
20.03.2006 
Jenny Beate Hougen The analyst leader 
observed all the meetings 
with the team. The 
observations are presented 
as the analyst view in 
Chapter 6. 
Table 7 How and when we collected evidence 
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4.3.3.2 Second investigation: CORAS according to IT-security 
standards 
This field trial investigated organisations use of IT-security standards, and whether 
the standards used are those on which CORAS is based on. The investigation 
process is illustrated in Figure 15.  
At first it was necessary to get an overview of IT-security standards available in 
the market. With basis in those available standards found a questionnaire were 
created. The questionnaire was sent to different organisations. The questionnaire is 
presented in Appendix B.  The result from the survey are discussed and evaluated 




Figure 15 Overview of the second investigation 
 
Figure 16 shows the milestones of the second investigation. 
 
 
Figure 16Milestones during the second investigation 
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4.3.4 Evaluation and discussion 
The last process of the research was evaluating and discussing the results. Chapter 
6 presents an evaluation of the results from the security analysis performed in 
Agresso. Chapter 7 presents an evaluation from investigating CORAS according to 
other IT-security standards. These evaluations are input to the discussion in Chapter 
8. 
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Chapter 5                                       
Hypotheses for the evaluation of 
CORAS 
The starting point for the evaluation was a set of predefined hypotheses. The 
hypotheses were subsequently used together with the evidence collected during the 
research to discuss whether they were fulfilled or not. For the evaluation to be 
success the formulated hypotheses should be validated ideally either verified or 
falsified.  
 
This chapter presents the hypotheses used to evaluate the investigation results. The 
next sections present the formulated hypotheses pursuant to the two investigations; 
the CORAS’s framework and CORAS according to IT-security standards.  
5.1 Hypotheses with respect to the CORAS 
framework 
Since CORAS already has established requirements and goals, the hypotheses 
according to the CORAS framework are formulated with respect to these. Below is 
an overview of some of the requirements used as a basis [8]: 
 
 Security: Help protect confidentiality, integrity and availability of data. 
 The CORAS methodology: 
o Simple: It is easy to understand.  
o Efficient: More efficient than other similar tools. 
o Teamwork: Possible to cooperate and work well in teams.  
o Flexibility: Accommodate the user’s needs.   
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 The different user groups: There are different requirements on how CORAS 
should work within the different groups. When doing security analysis the 
CORAS methodology requires involvement of different participants as risk 
analyst, developer, researchers, and decision makers.  
 The documentation: Defines a way to document and store the results. The 
CORAS tool is meant for document and store the results. The tool should 
contain facilities to make complete standardised formats of the risk analysis 
report. They should be understandable and sensible, and accommodate the 
different user groups.   
 
Theses requirement were considered when formulating both the hypothesis and the 
hypothesis sub-statement. In the next sections the hypotheses for the  
CORAS UML profile, the CORAS tool and the CORAS RMP is presented. 
5.1.1 Hypotheses with respect to the use of the CORAS UML 
profile 
CORAS UML profile is used to support the risk management process. To get a 
common understanding of the target of analysis, threats, vulnerabilities and risks is 
important in an analysis. The CORAS UML profile should support this [1].  
 
In the security analysis process CORAS requires the involvement of different kinds 
of people. They are involved in different ways. It is common to distinguish between 
three main groups: the security analysis experts, system experts, and the users of 
the system. The security analysts are experts on CORAS, and are familiar with the 
elements and the strategy used in the analysis. The system experts are not familiar 
with CORAS, but they typically have a complete understanding of the system and 
the terms related to security. The users of the system normally have insignificant 
technical insight. They see the system from a non-technical view and have usually 
no security knowledge.  
The challenge here is when the analysis team communicates. Due to the 
participants’ different backgrounds and knowledge, misunderstandings may occur. 
Two people with different backgrounds will probably have different 
comprehensions of the same thing. E.g. a farmer and a building constructor may not 
have the same illusion of a high-class building (Figure 17). It is believed that the use 
of graphical drawings and models will solve such problems. 
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Figure 17 Communication problems 
 
 
Together with the standardised modelling language UML and CORAS specific 
elements the CORAS developers believe that the communication between the 
analysis participants will be improved and avoid misunderstandings.  
Can a model stand alone (Figure 18)? A model alone is not a good explanation, 




Figure 18 Can a model stand alone? 
 
 
With these viewpoints as a basis, hypotheses were specified with respect to the use 
of the CORAS UML profile in the analysis process. 
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HYPOTHESIS 1: Terms and icons used in CORAS are intelligible for all parts 
involved in the analysis 
 The security terms are well known 
 The CORAS icons are intelligible  
 UML is well known and serves an expressive way to explain the analysis 
objects 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The unwanted incidents and treatment diagrams are easy to 
understand and support the analysis process. 
 The diagrams are easy to understand 
 Use of models improves the communication in the analysis team. 
 Use of models prevents misunderstandings and mistakes among the analysis 
team. 
 Use of models increases the efficiency of the risk analysis process. 
 Use of models improves the process of finding possible threats and unwanted 
incidents 
5.1.2 Hypotheses with respect to the CORAS tool 
The purpose of the CORAS tool is to support to the methodology process. The tool 
should assist the CORAS experts to achieve efficient and good results. It should 
satisfy the requirement of good documentation. The tool offers ways to document 
and store results which allow the tool users to create their own experience library. 
The analysis expert could reuse previous analysis results and hence achieve 
efficient and good results. Based on the features created and saved during the 
analysis the tool can generate an analysis report. The tool also conducts a short 
tutorial of the steps in the CORAS methodology. 
In order to reveal the quality of the CORAS tool the Hypothesis 3 was 
established. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The CORAS tool improves the analysis and increases the 
efficiency of the analysis 
 The analyst leader finds it easy to learn the tool 
 The tool gives a good description of the analysis steps 
 The functionalities in the tool work as intended  
 The report generator is good   
5.1.3 Hypotheses with respect to the CORAS risk 
management process 
It is not only important to understand the CORAS’s terms, models and icons. The 
most important factor is to achieve a good result by delivering an analysis result 
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that is reasonable and useful.  The overall objective is to find all relevant risks and 
to suggest a way of treating them.  
An approach of CORAS is to please the customers. There are several factors 
involved when deciding whether an analysis was successful. Both the analysis team 
and the organisation’s management should be satisfied. The CORAS customers 
should feel that CORAS gave them what promised. Some of the factors CORAS 
promises are cost-efficient analysis, good documentation and the possibilities for 
reuse. To determine if the analysis pleased the customer, there were specified 
hypotheses related to this. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: The CORAS customer was pleased and intended to continue to 
use CORAS in the future  
 The analysis process was efficient 
 The risk analysis report was understandable and sensible. 
 Use of security analysis will help the design team building secure and good 
systems.  
 
During a CORAS RMP structured meetings are conducted. The results of these 
meetings are important according to the process of finding risks. There was of 
interest to find out whether the structured meetings are a good and efficient way of 
finding risks and whether the suggested composition of the team members is 
appropriate. This led to Hypothesis 5. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 5: The result and the accomplishment of the analysis meetings was 
good 
 The communication during the meetings was good 
 The analysis meetings were efficient 
 The composition of the team members with different backgrounds was 
appropriate 
 
5.2 Hypotheses with respect to IT-security 
standards 
According to the investigation of CORAS according to IT-security standards there 
exists no requirement. The goal of the investigation was to find out whether 
organisations use IT-security standards, and if the standards used are the same as 
CORAS is based on. The hypotheses are motivated from this goal.  
 
The CORAS framework is based on several IT-security standards. CORAS is 
mainly based on Australian IT-security standard for risk management AS/NZS 
4360. In Table 8 presents an overview of the standards on which the parts of the 
CORAS framework are based. [1] Of these standards there are only AS/NZS 4360, 
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ISO/IEC 17799, ISO 13335 and IEC 61508 are used for IT-security. As displayed 
in the table the AS/NZS 4360 is represented in all parts of the CORAS framework. 
 
CORAS field Standard 
The CORAS 
terminology 
AS/NZS 4360:1999, ISO/IEC 17799-1:1999, ISO/IEC WD 






ISO/IEC 10746, AS/NZS 4360:1999 
Table 8 Overview Standards CORAS is based on 
 
By cover the use and need for such standards will probably also cover the need for 
CORAS. An appropriate question is the organisations’ familiarity with, and 
adherence to, standards. The following hypotheses are related to this question 
(Hypothesis 6 and Hypothesis 7).  
 
HYPOTHESIS 6: The CORAS framework is based on standards already in use 
among organisations 
 The majority of organisations follow the AS/NZS 4360 standard 
 The majority of organisations are familiar ISO 17799 standard 
 The majority of organisations are familiar with ISO 13335 
 The majority of organisations are familiar with IEC 61508 
 
HYPOTHESIS 7: There is a need for good IT-security standards among 
organisations 
 The use of IT-security standards makes the organisation more competitive 
 IT-security standards are required by the organisations’ clients  
 Use of IT-security standards will increase the efficiency in the development 
process 
 The use of standards improves the product quality and the development 
process quality  
 The use of standards increases the customers trust in the products 
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Chapter 6                                        
CORAS field trial in Agresso 
In order to investigate the validity of the hypotheses in Chapter 5.1 a major case 
study was accomplished; the security analysis in Agresso. In order to gather results 
there were performed surveys among the analysis participants. In addition the 
analyst leader collected experience during the analysis. This chapter evaluates the 
results collected during the security analysis in Agresso.  
 
The structure of each chapter section is illustrated in Figure 19. Each section start 
with a presentation of the results gathered from the analysis team and the analyst 
leader’s observations and experiences. Except for the CORAS tool section which 
only consists of the result from the analyst leader. The sections are arranged in the 
same order as the hypotheses in Chapter 5. The presented results are compared with 
the hypotheses from Chapter 5 for evaluation.  
As presented in Chapter 4.3.3.1 there were performed two surveys and one 
interview referred as Questionnaire 1, Questionnaire 2 and Interview. Each section 
refers to the particular questionnaire and interview where the results are obtained. 
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Figure 19Chapter structure 
 
The following subsections contain; an analysis summary, the results and evaluation 
of using the CORAS UML profile, the CORAS tool and the CORAS RMP. 
6.1 Analysis summary 
A security analysis was carried out in cooperation with Agresso in the period 
January to March 2006, targeting the AGRESSO system. The goal of the analysis 
was to identify risks related to the AGRESSO functionality and suggest treatments 
to identified risks. 
The analysis a team consisted of six people with different backgrounds; a 
security expert, a system designer, a developer, a system expert, a customer 
representative and the security analyst. The team members had no particular 
experience with security analysis and only one team member had participated in a 
similar analysis.  
 
The analysis team carried out seven meetings before the result was finished. An 
overview of the analysis meetings is given in Table 9. During the analysis there 










10.01.2006 Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
Erik Inge Marcussen, 
Jenny B. Hougen 
Together with two of the 
team members the analyst 
leader established an 
understanding of the 
target. UML models of the 
target were created. 










24.01.2006 Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
Erik Inge Marcussen, 
Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Truls Tveøy, Helge 
T. Blindheim, Jenny 
B Hougen 
The team members were 
introduced to CORAS. 
The team achieved a 
common understanding of 




01.02.2006 Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
Erik Inge Marcussen, 
Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Truls Tveøy, Helge 
T. Blindheim, Jenny 
B Hougen 
Brainstorming. The group 
was separated into two 
subgroups. Each subgroup 
got UML diagrams from 
the context identification 
and an empty HazOp table 




08.02.2006 Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
Erik Inge Marcussen, 
Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Truls Tveøy, Helge 
T. Blindheim, Jenny 
B Hougen 





14.03.2006 Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
Erik Inge Marcussen, 
Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Truls Tveøy, Helge 
T. Blindheim, Jenny 
B Hougen 
Frequency and 
consequence values were 





20.03.2006 Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
Erik Inge Marcussen, 
Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Truls Tveøy, Helge 
T. Blindheim, Jenny 
B Hougen 
Continued the estimation 
process. Evaluated each 
risk and decided what 
risks to treat. 
Risk treatment 21.04.2006 Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
Erik Inge Marcussen, 
Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Truls Tveøy, Jenny B 
Hougen 
Treatment approval and 
closing of the analysis.  
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6.2 Using the CORAS UML profile 
The intentions with the analysis was firstly to find out how well the analysis 
participants understand the CORAS UML profile, secondly to find out whether the 
use of models improved the analysis process.   
 
This section presents analysis teams and analyst leader’s viewpoint of the CORAS 
UML profile.  
6.2.1 The analysis team’s view 
There is of relevance that the analysis participants received a short introduction of 
CORAS’s elements and concepts before the Questionnaire 1 were handed out. The 
results are based on the knowledge they had after the introduction. 
This section proposes the results from the team members’ knowledge and 
opinions of the risk terms, the CORAS icons and the CORAS diagrams.  
6.2.1.1 The risk terms 
Risk terms are frequently used during an analysis process. The terms and icons 
used may be unknown for the analysis participants. Below is the result from the 
Agresso analysis participants knowledge of the terms and icons used in the analysis 
performed in Agresso.   
 
Questionnaire 1 result 
The participants were asked about their knowledge of certain risk terms. The results 
are displayed in Figure 20. In general most of the terms were familiar among the 
team. Three of the terms were familiar to the entire team. It was the “threat”, 
“vulnerability” and “risk”.  
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Not familiar with it
Heard of it
Familiar with the concept
 
Figure 20 Knowledge of terms and concepts in a security analysis 
 
Interview results 
In the interview, the participants were asked if some terms had been more difficult 
to understand than others. The answers from the interviewees are given in Table 10.  
 
Question Interviewee Answer 
Team 
member 1 
The term “asset” is not a much used word. It 
may be a bit unknown and the actual meaning 








Not a big problem to understand the concepts 
after they had been introduced.  
Table 10 The interviewees’ knowledge of terms 
6.2.1.2 The CORAS icons 
The CORAS icons (elements) are used to create threats and unwanted incidents 
diagrams. The purpose is to create good visualised diagrams that are easy to 
understand for the analysis participants. The results from the analysis team’s 
opinion about the icons are presented below.  
 
Questionnaire 1 result 
After the first meeting the participants were asked whether they found the CORAS 
elements easy to understand. The results are displayed in Figure 21. It shows that the 
majority believed the CORAS element are easy to understand. 
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Figure 21 Participants understanding of the CORAS elements 
 
Interview result 
In the interview the participants were asked if the icons are difficult to understand. 
The result is presented in Table 11. 
  
Question Interviewee Answer 
Team member 1 The icons were a bit difficult to understand.  
The comprehensibility depend that the 
participants have some general knowledge 






Team member 2 Not a big problem to understand the CORAS 
icons. 
Table 11 Interviewees results comprehensibility of the CORAS icons 
 
6.2.1.3 The CORAS diagrams 
The CORAS diagrams are used to depict unwanted incident (threat) and their 
possible treatment. The diagrams are meant as a help to document and store the 
results and help the team members communicate and understand each other. This 
section represents the team judgement and understanding of the CORAS diagram.  
 
Questionnaire 2 result 
The CORAS diagrams inherit several aspects from UML. The participants UML 
knowledge may be relevant according to their understanding of the CORAS 
graphical language. In Questionnaire 2 the participants were asked whether they 
were familiar with UML. The result is given in Figure 22.  
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Figure 22participants knowledge of UML 
 
In order to find the participants opinion of the CORAS graphical language several 
propositions were stated. The participants’ agreement rates are presented in Figure 
23. Generally the participants believed that the use of diagrams had positive effect 
on the analysis. 
 


















The use of models
improves the
analysis
























The interviewees were asked what they thought of the CORAS diagrams, whether 
the diagrams were easy to understand and whether they represented a good way of 
displaying the results. The result is presented in Table 12.  
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Question Interviewee Answer 
Team member 1 Difficult to understand. The analyst leader 
should have used more time explaining them. 
An idea is to let the team member try drawing it 
themselves.  




Team member 2 They were mainly self-explanatory.  Easy to 
understand since I have been modelling a lot. 
Joining the diagrams with the HazOp table was 
a good combination. Use of diagrams to 
visualise is good. The CORAS diagrams were 
good to visualise the risks. 
Table 12 Interviewee results of the CORAS diagrams 
6.2.2 The security analyst’s observations 
This section gives the result from the analyst opinion of the CORAS UML profile. 
The results are based on the analyst’s own experience of the analysis and the 
analyst’s observation of the analysis team. Table 13 gives the analyst result on the 
CORAS UML profile. 
 
Viewpoint Result 
The risk terms The analyst leader was not familiar with the term “asset” 
before learning the CORAS method. It is a term that is not 
frequently used in other contexts. 
The analyst gained knowledge about the team after seeing 
them in action. Based on that the analyst leader believe that 
some of the terms like asset and unwanted incident would not 
have been insufficiently understood if not explained. 
The CORAS icons The threat scenario icon and threat agents used in the 
diagrams were related to terrorist and terror by the team 
members. 
By using the Figure 9 (in Chapter 2) when introducing CORAS 
it helped the team to understand the terms better. 
The CORAS 
diagrams 
It seamed difficult for the team members to distinguish 
between unwanted incidents and threat scenario, but the 
diagrams made it easier for the team to indicate agreement, 
disagreement and change. Thus it made the communication 
easier and probably more efficient. A common interpretation 
of the diagrams would probably improve the analysis process. 
The use of models made it easier to start conversations and 
express opinions among the team. This probably resulted in 
less misunderstandings and mistakes.  
Table 13  Security analyst viewpoint of the CORAS UML profile 
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6.2.3 Evaluation of the CORAS UML profile 
Bellow follows an evaluation of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in Chapter 5.1.1 
based on the previous result. It is important to have in mind that the questionnaire 
results may have taken another direction if the survey were performed before the 
participants were introduced to CORAS. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Terms and icons used in CORAS are intelligible for all parts 
involved in the analysis 
 The security terms are well known 
 The CORAS icons are intelligible  




The security terms are well known. The use of risk terms is frequent used in a 
security analysis. The concepts may be difficult to understand for people unfamiliar 
with security analyses. According to the Agresso analysis team there was different 
knowledge of some of the terms used.  
“Threat”, “vulnerability” and “risk” were terms the team had no problem to 
understand. It could be because those are words we use in the daily life.  
Four of five were familiar with “unwanted incident” and “asset”. The fact that 
one was not familiar with the words may be because of the analyst leader’s 
presentation was vague and that the team members had difficulties understanding 
the meaning of it. It may be difficult to understand some of the words because they 
are not frequently used and the meaning of it may be confusing (as pointed out by 
the interviewees in Table 10). 
The terms “confidentiality”, “integrity” and “availability” are security related 
words. The knowledge of these words is different among the team members. It 
could be related to that the knowledge of IT-security distinct between the team 
members. One out of five was not familiar with “integrity” and “availability”. 
“Integrity” seems to be more diffuse than “availability”. None of the team members 
had problems understanding “confidentiality”. The reason could be because the 
term “confidentiality” is used in other relations than security. 
It seems that the understanding of risk terms is related to the analysis 
participants’ background and the analysts’ explanation. It also affects the teams 
understanding, whether the word is self explanatory or used frequently in other 
relations. 
 
The CORAS icons are intelligible. The purpose of the CORAS icons is to express 
graphically such that everyone involved in a CORAS risk analysis can understand.  
The survey result in section 6.2.1.2 indicates that the analysis participants found 
the CORAS elements (icons) easy to understand. But when interviewed, Team 
member 1 thought the icons was a bit difficult to understand (Table 11). The survey 
was performed after the context identification meeting and before the icons was 
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used in any diagram. The interview was performed after the risk identification 
meetings where the icons were used in diagrams.  
By observing, the analyst noticed that the threat scenario and threat agent icons 
were associated to terror and terrorist by the team members (Table 13). To some 
people this appears improper. 
 
UML is well known and serves an expressive way to explain the analysis objects. 
The participants’ knowledge of UML may be indicative of the participants 
understand and favour the CORAS models. According to the result in Figure 22 all 
the participants were familiar with UML, thus this results indicates that UML is 
well known. 
As presented in Figure 23 the participants disagreed that the use of diagrams in 
an analysis is irrelevant. One of the participants partly agreed that the diagrams 
were difficult to understand when the others disagreed. Thus pursuant to this 
analysis, the participants found the way of explaining the analysis objects to be 
understandable and not wasted, but it can not be concluded that this is the best way 
to do it. 
 
Conclusion. It is important that the analysis participants have the same 
understanding of the words and concepts used in an analysis. The participants’ 
backgrounds may be essential for in their knowledge of risk terms and 
understanding of the icons. In this analysis the risk terms and CORAS’ icons were 
not essential problem for the participants. UML was a known technique among the 
team, but do the team thinks it is an expressive way to explain the analysis objects? 
To answer the HYPOTHESIS 1 the statement is true according to this analysis if 
the team gets a short introduction to CORAS. Since the team were familiar with 
UML this may also be a reason that they found it easy to understand the icons.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The unwanted incidents and treatment diagrams are easy to 
understand and support the analysis process. 
 The diagrams are easy to understand 
 Use of models improves the communication in the analysis team 
 Use of models prevents misunderstandings and mistakes among the analysis 
team 
 Use of models increases the efficiency of the risk analysis process 
 Use of models improves the process of finding possible threats and unwanted 
incidents 
 
The diagrams are easy to understand. The CORAS diagram should be easy to 
understand for everyone involved in the analysis. In the interview of the two team 
members (Table 12) they had different opinions on the comprehensibility of the 
diagrams. Team member 1 found the diagrams difficult to understand. He believed 
that the analyst leader could have explained the diagrams more and that the team 
could be involved in the process of drawing the diagrams, then they would be 
easier to understand. Team member 2 had a different opinion; he found the 
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diagrams to be mostly self-explanatory. The combination of the threat diagram 
together with a description of the diagram in the HazOp table was good, he thought.  
The reason for the various answers from the two team members may be of their 
different background knowledge. Team member 2 has much experience in 
modelling. If Team member 1 does not have experience with modelling that may be 
a reason that he found it difficult to understand the diagrams.  
 
Use of models improves the communication in the analysis team. Visualising 
threats and unwanted incidents will probably improve the communication among 
the team participants. By using models makes it easier to indicate where to make 
changes and where to agree or disagree. As presented in Figure 23 three (75 %) of 
the team members agreed to the hypothesis that use of diagrams made the 
communication easy while one partly agreed. The analyst’s compression was that 
models made the process easier.  
 
Use of models prevents misunderstandings and mistakes among the analysis team. 
Different people with different backgrounds are involved in a security analysis. 
This fact often results in different comprehensions and misunderstandings among 
the team. The purpose of using models is to avoid the misunderstandings.  
According to the analyst’s experience in Table 13 the use of models led to fewer 
misunderstandings among the team. The result in Figure 23 shows that three of the 
team members believed the use of models improved the analysis while one partly 
agreed.  
 
Use of models increases the efficiency of the risk analysis process. Underlying this 
statement is the anticipation that models-based in a security analysis will improve 
the communication flow and reduce misunderstandings. Thereby, the analysis 
process will probably be more efficient. All team participants agreed that the use of 
models made the analysis more efficient. 
 
Use of models improves the process of finding possible threats and unwanted 
incidents. It is difficult to decide if the use of models improved the risk 
identification process. There is no specific result which indicates that the use of 
models will improve the process. But good communication, less misunderstandings 
and efficiency are elements that will have impact on the result. If the models 
improve these elements they will probably improve the process of finding threats 
and unwanted incidents. 
 
Conclusion. The use of models such as the unwanted incident and threat diagrams 
are meant to support the analysis process. To support the analysis process the 
models must be; simple to understand, help improve the communication, help avoid 
misunderstandings, and increase the efficiency of the analysis. In addition the 
models may help finding possible threats. In general, the participants of this 
analysis found that the models were eased comprehension and improved 
communication. It was not possible to tell from the results if the use of models 
increased the analysis efficiency, reduced misunderstandings or improved the 
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process of finding threats. Thus in order to answer Hypothesis 2 there was lack of 
results and it is not able to answer. The hypothesis is not verified, but remains 
provisional.  
6.3 Experience with the CORAS tool 
The CORAS tool was used by the analyst leader during the analysis process. This 
section presents the analyst experience of the tool. The purpose was to find out 
whether the CORAS tool satisfies its intention or not. The results are compared 
with the Hypothesis 3 in Chapter 5.1.2.  
6.3.1 Results from using the CORAS tool 
The CORAS tool offers different functionalities. Whit regard to this analysis the 
tool was used for three purposes: 
 
 As a guide through the analysis: The tool was used as a guide when 
performing the analysis.  
 Create and save the analysis project results: The analyst used the tool to 
create a project for the analysis performed. During the analysis process the 
findings were saved in the particular project.  
 Generate an analysis report: When the analysis was finished the tool 
generated a report on the results and saved in the analysis project. 
 
Through these three user areas the analyst gathered experience through learning 
and using. The next sections present the analyst’s observations from learning the 
tool, using the CORAS methodology guide and by using the different 
functionalities in the tool (e.g. creating tables, importing files, using the diagram 
editor or generating the analysis report)   
 
6.3.1.1 The process of learning the tool 
The analyst had no experience from other risk analysis tools and was first 
introduced to the CORAS tool version 2.0 in August 2005. This version had some 
problems and a new version 2.0.1 was released in October 2005. This result is 
based on the new release of the tool.  
 
The process of learning the tool was by trying it on a small case before using it in a 
real organisation. These results are gathered from both cases. Disadvantages and 








Disadvantages To start the tool, we must first start the server and then start 
the client. 
Easy to understand for users that are familiar with similar 
tools. 
Easy to navigate 
Advantages 
Logical tool structure 
Table 14 Results from learning The CORAS tool 
6.3.1.2 Using the CORAS methodology guide 
A feature of the tool is the CORAS methodology guide that describes the analysis 
process. The guide suggests accomplishing activities and sub-activities during each 
step of the analysis. The analyst followed this guide through the analysis process 
and identified advantages and disadvantages based on the experience through the 
analysis process (Table 15). 
 
Status Description 
If the analysis expert is not familiar with CORAS some 
CORAS-related expressions and words may be insufficiently 
explained. Explanations should include examples of the 
different actives.  
Disadvantages 
Missing a “Home” option that brings you back to the first 
page of the methodology guide. 
Advantages The guide is well structured and offers good help when it 
comes to remember the different activities 
Table 15 Results from using the CORAS methodology guide 
6.3.1.3 Using the functionalities in the tool 
The tool offers different functionalities to support the activities in the methodology 
and store the analysis result. The user can create the methodology’s suggested 
tables and diagrams. Table 16 presents the results from using theses functionalities 
during the analysis. The table is divided into different functionalities that exist in 
the tool. The functionalities may list deficiencies, errors and advantages. 
 
 
Functionality Status Description 
No ability to add user-defined icons. 
The vulnerability icon is missing. 
Deficiencies 
The elements in the editor are not up to date. . 
Diagram 
editor 
Advantages An undo function exists. 
No opportunity to create additional columns 
in a table. 
Table Deficiencies 
Missing a restore opportunity when deleting a 
table column. 
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Functionality Status Description 
No opportunity to create user-defined tables. 
Changing the column size or row size is not 
allowed. 
It Should be possible to remove rows in the 
Value of definition table.  
Not Possible to mark out rows or columns. It 
is only possible to mark out one field at a 
time.  
The Target of Evaluation (ToE) table should 
change name to Target of Analysis (ToA). 
ToE was the old name of this table. 
The objectives row in the Target of Analysis 
table is missing. 
The risk matrix table should name the 
low/medium/high columns consequence (see 
Figure 24). This could be done by e.g. adding 
a row above the low, medium and high cells. 
Error in the 
functionality 
The predefined tables are linked to the 
appropriate folder in the risk analysis project. 
Advantages Detail fields can not be removed. We have to 
manually remove the fields when the report is 
generated. 
The generated pictures are too large for the 
report. 
With the 8 pt font size of the generated report 
makes it hard to read. 
It is not possible to generate a report when the 
name of the elements (tables etc.) stored in 
the project is three characters or less. 
There is no list of tables. 
There is no list of figures. 
Deficiencies 
It is not possible to update the table of content 
because the formatting is not used correctly. 
The detail viewpoint fail to appear in the 
generated report 
No save option. It should be possible to save 
an element before closing. The user has to 
close tables, diagrams etc. to save work. 
Report 
generator 
Error in the 
functionality 
The document print-out displays erroneous 
page number. E.g. Page 9 of 43 becomes Page 
9 of 9.  
No undo opportunity. 
Impossible to delete several files/elements at 
the same time. 
General Deficiencies 
Impossible to alter the location of the 
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Functionality Status Description 
imported element. E.g., an element in the risk 
identification folder cannot be moved to the 
risk analysis folder. 
Error in the 
functionality 
The Risk analysis folder in the project view 
should be named Risk estimation as in the 
methodology guide. 




Figure 24 Table errors in the Risk matrix 
6.3.2 Evaluation of the CORAS tool 
The results were evaluated based on Hypothesis 3 from chapter 5.1.2. Below is a 
discussion whether the Hypothesis is fulfilled or not. 
  
HYPOTHESIS 3: The CORAS tool improves the analysis and increases the 
efficiency of the analysis 
 The analyst leader finds it easy to learn the tool 
 The tool gives a good description of the analysis steps 
 The functionalities in the tool work as intended  
 The report generator is good   
 
The analyst leader finds it easy to learn the tool.  Before testing the tool on people 
with different knowledge of similar tools, it can not be proved whether it was easy 
to learn the tool or not.  But according to the analyst experience the tool was easy to 
learn.  
One drawback was that the CORAS-server has to run before the CORAS-client 
can start. The user should not have to start more than one service when starting a 
program.  
After the analyst had started the tool, there was no big difficulty learning the tool 
and the analyst find it structured and easy to navigate.  
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The tool gives a good description of the analysis steps. During the analysis process 
the CORAS methodology guide were used by the analyst to follow the 
recommended activities in the process. The analyst found it difficult to understand 
some of the activities. The reason could be that the analyst was not familiar with 
CORAS. The analyst requested examples on the different activities. There should 
be a “home” option that returns to the first page.  
The analyst finds it structured and well described. The description of the steps in 
the analysis is good if you are familiar with CORAS, but there should be more 
examples of the different activities. 
To summarise, the methodology description is structured and easy to follow, but 
there is a lack of examples. 
 
The functionalities in the tool work as intended. Most of the functionality in the 
tool was logical. It was easy to navigate. But it requires that we are familiar with 
similar tools and have knowledge about computer science. There were deficiencies 
and errors in the program functionality. These are displayed in Table 16. Some of 
these errors decreased the analysis process performance.  
There were not found any particular errors with the diagram editor. But there 
exist some deficiencies. It is only possible to use the icons that already exist in the 
tool. The opportunity to add user-defined icons is missing. Because of this 
deficiency the drawings were created in another editor. 
As in the diagram editor there exists deficiencies in the table functionality. The 
tool allows the user to create tables based on the activities in the analysis. The 
advantage is that it helps to add the tables in the correct part of the analysis. Some 
tables are predefined with row and column size. A lack is that it is not possible to 
change the column size and there is only possible to mark out one field in a table. 
This means that if we want to copy the entire table we can only copy one field at a 
time. This will slow down the process. The fact that it is not possible to change the 
column size in the editor that means we have to wait until the report is created and 
change it in the document which easily could be avoided. If these flaws were 
avoided, the performance would increase. Another error is the missing consequence 
name in the risk matrix.  
A general deficiency in all the functionalities is the undo opportunity. There 
exists no undo function which means that if we accidentally delete a table it would 
be lost. It results in more time used, because the table has to be created over again. 
Another feature that was missed during the time using the tool was the opportunity 
to save elements when working with them. When creating large tables or advanced 
models it is required to save work during the process, because it is not desired to 
lose the work if the program accidentally shuts down. This is not an opportunity in 
the menu. 
To summarise there is quite a lot which remains to be done before the 
functionality of the tool is good enough. Among the major flaws are lacks of undo 
and save opportunity.  
 
The report generator is good. There exists a major error in the report generator 
functionality. It is not possible to generate reports when the analysis elements’ 
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name is three characters or less. It is almost impossible for a user to guess what 
makes the error, hence for a user that gets this error it would be difficult to generate 
a report or the user would use a lot of time to figure out what makes the error. 
Another thing missing in the report generator was to be able to decide what to 
include in the report. Not all of the detail fields are necessary in every analysis. In 
addition the viewpoint field in the detail section is not a part of the detail section of 
the generated report.  
The pictures in the generated report are too big for the document and you can 
only se half of them. Hence there will take time to change the size of each picture. 
To summarise, the report generator is not flexible (cannot choose what elements to 
include, font size and type etc.). It has this major error which can result in 
frustration and wasted time for the user. Thus it does not do the work efficiently 
many fixes remain before the report generated can be evaluated as good.   
 
Conclusion. To answer the Hypothesis 3, there are still many features of the 
CORAS tool which should be improved. The tool is easy to learn and the 
methodology description is OK, there are a lot of deficiencies and errors in the 
functionalities and the report generator was not good. Thus the tool does not make 
the analysis process more efficiency. It is a help in the way that all the analysis 
results are structured and gathered in one place. The present condition of the tool 
does not offer help in the analysis process, but when the disadvantages are removed 
the tool will be helpful.  
6.4 The CORAS risk management process 
This section gives the results of the CORAS RMP. While carrying out the CORAS 
RMP it involves using the CORAS UML profile and the CORAS tool. The section 
gives the analysis team’s view and the analyst view of the entire process. These 
results are estimated with the Hypothesis 5 and Hypothesis 6 from 5.1.3.  
6.4.1 The analysis team’s view 
The CORAS UML profile and the CORAS tool are both a part of the CORAS 
RMP. They are elements to support the analysis process. This section covers the 
team’s view of the CORAS RMP and the things that may influence the process. 
6.4.1.1 The analysis team 
The analysis team were asked whether they think a security analysis is useful. Two 
of the team members were of the opinion that a security analysis always is useful 
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Interview result 
The interviewees were asked about their opinions of the team composition. The 
results are displayed in Table 17.  
 
Question Interviewee Answer 
Team member 
1 
There were too many participants with a system 
development view. There should been more with 
a customer view. The number of participants was 
appropriate. 
What do you 








The number of participants was appropriate. 
More people would affect the conversation; it 
would be more unnecessary chatting. Less 
people would be too few. 
Table 17 Interviewee opinion of the analysis team 
Questionnaire 2 result  
Proposition of the analysis team were stated and the participants were asked 
whether they agreed or not. The results are given in Figure 25. 
 















































Figure 25The analysis team opinion about the team 
 
Table 18 presents the answers and comments where the participants were asked 
about the number of participants appropriate in an analysis.  
 
Question Option Answers 
Less than 5 0 (1) 
5-6 3 (4)  
7-9 0 
Various 0 






Comment One of the questionnaire participants meant it 
should be less than five or 5-6 participants. 
Therefore the numbers in parenthesis. There 
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Question Option Answers 
were totally four participants in this 
questionnaire. 
Table 18 Questionnaire 2 result on number of participants in an analysis 
6.4.1.2 The analysis meetings 
The CORAS risk management process suggests accomplishing several meetings 
with the organisation in order to perform an analysis. 
 
Interview result 
In the interview the team members were asked what they think of the 
communication on the meetings (presented in Table 19).  
 
Question Interviewee Answer 
Team member 
1 
The communication was OK. There was not 
much diversion. 
What do you 






The communication was pretty much good. But 
it was sometimes difficult to understand what 
the other participants meant, specially the 
participants that had another background in the 
project. 
Table 19 Interviewee opinion of the communication during the meetings 
 
The interviewees were asked what they thought about the risk identification 
meeting, whether it was effective and whether it would be good to involve other 
people during the process. The result is presented in Table 20.  
 
Question Interviewee Answer 
Team member 
1 
Of course there are things that could be 
improved, but altogether it was efficiency. 
Splitting into groups (Buzzgroups) was not 
necessary. In this case it was not ideal to involve 













The brainstorming session could be done 
differently.  
Table 20 Interviewee opinion of the Risk identification meeting 
 
Questionnaire 1 result 
To get an impression of the analysis participants’ opinion of the Context 
identification meeting they were asked to give their agreement of the propositions. 
The result is given in Figure 26.  
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Figure 26 Analysis team opinions on the Context identification meeting 
 
6.4.1.3 The analysis process in general 
The participants were asked about their expectations, the analysis efficiency and 
future use of analysis in Agresso. All the results presented are achieved from 
Questionnaire 2.  
 
 






















Figure 27 Results of whether the analysis satisfied the teams’ expectations 
 
In addition to the questions the participants in the questionnaire may add 
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Comment Comments on the analysis expectations: 
Comment 1 My expectations were to learn about methodology and I got the 
chance. 
Comment 2 I did not have much expectations since I never have 
participated on a security analysis before 
Table 21 Comments to Figure 27 
 
Table 22 gives the results from the participants’ answer of what part of the 
development phase to perform a security analysis. The alternatives given to the 
participants were: All, before design, before implementation, after most of the 
implementation are finished, when the system is finished. 
 
Question Participant Answer 
Team member 1 Before design. Adding it to the design phase 
to have more definite to discuss could be 
advantageous  
Team member 2 Before design 
Team member 3 Before design and after most of the 
implementation is finished 
In what part of 
the design phase 




analysis? Team member 4 During the design process 
Table 22 Questionnaire 2 opinion about what part of development phase to perform an 
analysis 
 
Figure 28 establishes a comprehension whether the team believed the analysis 
process were effective or not.  






















Figure 28 The analysis participants’ opinion of the analysis efficiency 
 
In addition to the questions in Figure 28 the questionnaire participants could add 
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Comment Comments on the analysis efficiency: 
Comment 1 A bit difficult to focus on one particular point.  
Comment 2 (No) The analysis performed was too heavy to be used by all 
teams in Agresso. It was relatively time consuming, thus to use it 
as a part of development process for all teams would be difficult.  
Table 23 Comments to Figure 28 
 
Figure 29 displays whether the analysis team believed Agresso should have similar 
analyses in the future.  
 






















Figure 29 Future use of analysis 
 
 
6.4.2 Security analyst observations 
The analyst leader observed the team and the accomplishment of the meetings 
during the analysis process. The analyst’s opinion about the team and the analysis 
meetings is presented in Table 24 and Table 25. 
 
The team Analyst opinion 
The 
communication 
There were no problems to communicate during the meetings.    
Team roles and 
composition 
The composition of the different team roles was very good. 
Maybe it should be one more with customer view. 
Number of 
participants 
There should be no more than six participants. Because to 
simultaneous find available time for all participants were 
difficult. 
Table 24 Analyst observations about the analysis team 
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Analysis process Analyst opinion 
Context 
identifications 
The context identification meeting went well. No specific 
problems. The communication was good. But the CORAS 
elements should probably have been better explained. 
Risk 
identification 
It was difficult to get the communication started and to direct 
the team in right direction. Each of the two meeting lasted 2-3 
hours. These meetings should not last for more than two hours 
without a break. It was not necessary to divide the groups into 
two.   
Risk estimation 
and evaluation 
The challenge here was that there were no results from earlier 
analyses. There existed no logs or information that could help 
estimate the consequence and frequency values.  
Table 25 The analyst observations about the analysis meetings 
 
The analyst general impression of the entire analysis is given in Table 26. 
 
Question Analyst opinion 
In what part of 
the development 
process is a 
security analysis 
most useful? 
A security analysis should be accomplished together with the 
design phase or before the design.  
Was the analysis 
effective? 
The meetings were effective. The report generator decreased 
the analysis performance because of the deficiency and error in 




The diagrams are easy to understand when accompanied by 
description and if the participants are familiar with the terms 
used in the security analysis.  
Table 26 The analysis process in general 
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6.4.3 Evaluation of the CORAS risk management process 
This section evaluates Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5 based on the results from 
Section 6.4.1and Section 6.4.2. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: The CORAS customer was pleased and intended to continue to 
use CORAS in the future  
 The analysis process was efficient 
 The risk analysis report was understandable and sensible 
 Use of security analysis will help the design team building secure and good 
systems  
 
The analysis process was efficient. One purpose with the CORAS RMP is that it 
should be effective and time consuming. It is one of the factors that would probably 
contribute to organisations future use of CORAS. It is difficult to measure the 
effectiveness of an analysis. The analysis could e.g. be compared other similar 
analyses. The result in Figure 28 indicates the average team opinion of the analysis 
efficiency. According to one of the participant the analysis was too heavy to be 
accomplished on all the functionalities in Agresso.  
 
The risk analyst report was understandable and sensible.  This statement could not 
be answered since there do not exist any result pursuant to it.  
 
Use of security analysis will help the design team building secure and good 
systems.  There exists no result to evaluate this statement.  
 
Conclusion. It is difficult to verify the Hypothesis 4 since the results are 
insufficient. All the statements were diffuse.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 5: The result and the accomplishment of the analysis meetings was 
good 
 The communication during the meetings was good 
 The analysis meetings were efficient 
 The composition of the team members with different backgrounds was 
appropriate 
 
The communication during the meetings was good. There was generally agreement 
that the communication between the analysis participants were good. According to 
Figure 25 there was different opinion if some participants talked more than others. 
The reason for this may be that the persons that talked more than the others did not 
feel they talked more. The agreement of the proposition “everybody was heard” 
implies that even if some talked more than others there was not necessary negative. 
In the proposition “The different qualifications made the communication difficult”, 
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half of the team agreed. Altogether the team seemed satisfied with the 
communication.  
 
The analysis meetings were efficient. According to Figure 28 there was only one 
participant that did not believe the analysis meetings were efficient. In order to 
verify whether the analysis meeting were effective we need more information about 
why it was efficient.  
 
The composition of the team members with different backgrounds was appropriate.  
According to both the interview results, the questionnaire result and the analyst 
opinion the number of participants in the analysis were appropriate. The only 
objection was that there were too many with development background. It should 
rather be one more that represent the organisations customer. Figure 25 shows that 
there were agreement of that the different qualifications among the team improved 
the analysis. 
 
Conclusion. Two of statements in the Hypothesis 5 were verified. In order to 
answer whether the analysis meetings were effective, there should have been 
gathered additional information about why the meetings were effective. Thus the 
Hypothesis could not be fully verified.  
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Chapter 7                                  
CORAS according to IT-security 
standards 
The CORAS framework is based on several standards for security and risk 
management. [1]. This investigation purpose was to find out whether organisations 
need CORAS and whether the standards used are the same as those on which 
CORAS is based. To answer these questions a survey among twenty different 
organisations was accomplished. The result of the survey was used to answer the 
hypotheses in section 5.2.  
  
This chapter will give the results from the survey and an evaluation of the result. 
Before the results and evaluation are presented a summary of the survey process is 
given. 
7.1 Summary of IT-security standard 
investigation  
A questionnaire was designed for the purpose of covering the organisations’ use of 
IT-security standards. The questionnaire should be short enough so the 
organisations would take the time to answer it. The questionnaire created is given 
in Appendix B. 
 
The challenge was how to make the organisations answer the questionnaire. The 
goal was to get at least twenty answers from different organisations. On an Abelia 
(www.abelia.no) seminar the 23 of March there were 43 organisations represented. 
The participants were asked to complete the questionnaire. Twelve results were 
collected. The following weeks different organisations were contacted to get at 
least eight more results. On the 8 of April the goal of twenty collected results were 
accomplished.  
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7.2 Results from IT-security standard 
investigation 
The survey results are divided into three parts; information about the organisations, 
organisations’ opinions on the use of IT-security standards, organisations’ use of 
IT-security standards. 
7.2.1 About the organisations 
General information about each organisation was collected. The questionnaire 
started with questions about the organisation’s size, type of organisation, type of 
customers and the degree of software development. This section presents the result 
of these questions. 
 
The result in Figure 30 shows that most of the organisations that participated in the 
investigation have more than or equal to three hundred employees. 
 
Less than 25: 20% 
26 – 100:  25% 
101 – 300:  5% 
More than 300: 50% 
 

























Figure 30 Overview organisation size 
 
The result in Figure 31 illustrates the selections distribution between public and 
private sector. It indicates that the organisations participated were mostly private. 
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Private: 85 % 
Public: 10 % 





























Figure 31 Overview organisations types 
 
Figure 32  presents the organisations’ type of customer. As illustrated in the figure 
the organisations’ customers are generally from the private sector or form both 
sectors.  
 
Customers in public sector: 10 % 
Customers in private sector: 40% 
Customers equally in both sectors: 50% 
 
























Figure 32 Overview organisations type of customer 
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Figure 33 displays organisations degree of software development in Norway. 50% 
of the organisations have “little” or “some” of the software development in 





A great deal: 15% 
Everything: 30% 
 



























Figure 33 Overview organisations degree of software development 
 
7.2.2 Organisations’ opinions on the use of IT-security 
standards 
This section contains the result of finding out the organisations’ view of IT-security 
standards. To collect necessary information a list of propositions about 
organisations’ use of standards were prepared. The organisations were asked to 
rank their degree of agreement on each proposition. The result is given in Figure 34 
and Figure 35. 
 
The two figures show a small dominance of agreement of the propositions among 
the organisations.  
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Figure 34 Opinion about use of standards 1 
 















































Figure 35 Opinion about use of standards 2 
7.2.3 Organisations use of IT-security standards 
This section contains the results of locating organisations’ use and knowledge 
about known IT-security standards, whether they follow them or are certified by to 
them. The purpose was to investigate if organisations have knowledge about the 
standards on which CORAS is based. Most standards are not concerned with 
certification. Two results are presented; organisations use of standards to follow, 
and organisations use of certification standards.  
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Figure 36 gives the results from the use of standards organisations can follow. The 
figure indicates that most of the organisations are not familiar with any of the 
standards. The exception is the ISO 177799 (ISO 27002) standard more than half of 
the organisations follow this standard. Figure 37 presents an alternative view by 
adding the number of organisations that have heard of the standard to the number of 
organisations that follow it.  Information of each of the standards represented is 
given in the questionnaire in Appendix B. 
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Unanswered
 
Figure 36 Organisations use of standards to follow 
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Figure 37 Percent degree on organisations follow/heard of the standards 
 
Figure 38 displays possible certification standards. The questionnaire leaved out an 
opportunity “heard of it”. This may be the reason for the several unanswered 
results. Some of the organisations had created their own alternative “Heard of it”. 
This option is included in the figure. 
The alternatives “We are certified”, “Going to be certified”, “Not certified, but 
use it as a basis” and “Heard of it” were merged. The result is displayed in Figure 
39. It should be kept in mind that the result would probably be different if the 
missing alternative had existed in the questionnaire.  
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We are certified after this
Going to be certified after this
Not certified, but use it as an basis




Figure 38 Organisations use of standards for certification 
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Figure 39 Certification standards of which organisations are familiar with 
7.3 Evaluation of the It-security standard survey 
results 
Based on the previous results the hypotheses from chapter 5.2 are validated. There 
were totally twenty organisations participating in the survey. Most of the 
organisations were large and private6. Half of the organisations’ customers were 
evenly distributed between private and public sector, while 40% had only customer 
from the private sector.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 6 The CORAS framework is based on standards already in use 
among organisations 
 The majority of organisations follow the AS/NZS 4360 standard 
 The majority of  organisations are familiar with  the ISO 17799 standard 
 The majority of organisations are familiar with the ISO 13335 standard 
 The majority of organisations are familiar with the IEC 61508 standard 
 
The majority of organisations follow the AS/NZS 4360 standard. The AS/NZS 4360 
standard is widely integrated in the CORAS framework. The standard has been 
available for quite long since it was first published in 1995 [16].  From the results 
we can se that 30 % have heard of the standard where one of the organisations 
                                                 
6
 Of the selection 85% were private organisations and 50% of the organisations had more than three 
hundred employees. 
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follows the standard. As shown in this survey the AS/NZS 4360 standard, is the 
second most known among of the twelve standards (Figure 36). Only one of the 
twenty organisations follows this standard. It can not be concluded that most 
organisations follow it. However, this standard is the second most known standard 
according to this survey. Therefore, we may assume that that this standard is one of 
the best known among available IT-security standards.  
 
The majority of organisations follow the ISO 17799 standard. The CORAS 
terminology takes it basis partly in the ISO 17799 standard. In the survey there 
were 60 % (55% follows it) who either follow or have heard of the standard (Figure 
37). This is more than half of the organisations that participated in the survey. 
Based on this survey it can be assumed that organisations are familiar with the ISO 
17799 standard. 
 
The majority of organisations are familiar with the ISO 13335 standard. The ISO 
13335 standard is one of the standards the CORAS terminology is based on. In the 
result 15 % of the organisations have either heard of the ISO 13335 standard or 
follow it (Figure 37). Thus it is not reasonable to believe that organisations are 
familiar with the standard. 
 
The majority of organisations are familiar with the IEC 61508 standard. The IEC 
61508 is standard used for certification. As displayed in Figure 38, ten (50 %) of the 
organisations did not answer the question. This may be because the missing option 
“heard of it”. Thus it is difficult to decide whether organisations are familiar with 
the standard. The other ten organisations had not heard of the standard. Therefore it 
can be assumed that at least half of the organisations had not heard of the standard. 
Therefore according to this survey not a much known standard. 
 
Conclusion. Whether the CORAS framework is based on standards used in practice 
among organisations is difficult to answer. The selection of twenty organisations is 
not enough to conclude. But from this survey there can be affirmed that at least one 
of the four IT-security standards CORAS is based on is well known among 
organisations. This is the ISO 17799. The AS/NZS 4360 standard is also known, 
but it is not a standard organisations use to follow.  
To summarise, the organisations in this survey are not particularly familiar with 
standards. Since only one of the four standards, on which CORAS is based, were 
used in practice it can not be concluded that the standards CORAS is based on are 
the standards used in practice. Generally speaking, organisations do not know of 
many standards (Figure 36 and Figure 38).  
 
HYPOTHESIS 7 There is a need for good IT-security standards among 
organisations 
 The use of IT-security standards makes the organisation more competitive 
 IT-security standards are required  by the organisations’ clients  
 Use of IT-security standards will increase the efficiency in the development 
process 
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 The use of standards improves the product quality and the development 
process quality  
 The Use of standards increases the customers trust in products 
 Organisations have much focus on standards both in the organisation and in 
the market 
 
The use of IT-security standards makes the organisation more competitive. From 
the result in Figure 34 60 % of the organisations agreed in that the use of standards 
make them more competitive, while 35 % disagreed. Generally this survey showed 
that organisations believe the use of standards makes them more competitive. 
  
IT-security standards are required by the organisations’ clients. The organisations 
may have both Norwegian and international clients. Would the Norwegian and 
international clients have different requirement and demand according to the 
organisations use of IT-security standard? The result in Figure 34 shows that 40 % of 
the international customers demand use of standards and it is not demanded by 30 
%. While 35 % of the Norwegian clients demand use of standards and 40 % do not 
demand it. 25 % of the organisations could not decide if the customers demand use 
of standards.  
To summarise almost half of the organisations had customers that demanded use 
of standards, but we do not know whether it is required by the customers.  
 
Use of IT-security standards will increase the efficiency in the development 
process. The result in Figure 34 shows that 35 % of the organisation believed that the 
time of the development process increases if the organisation uses standards, while 
25 % disagreed. The majority of the organisation believed that the time of the 
development process would increase. This means that they probably do not believe 
that the efficiency in the development process will increase.   
 
The use of standards improves the product quality and the development process 
quality.  In Figure 35 60 % of the organisations answered that the use of standards 
improved the development process quality and 30 % disagreed. It also shows that 
twelve 60 % believed that the products quality will be improved while 35 % 
disagreed. More than half of the organisations agreed in both propositions. Thus 
this survey shows that organisations believe the use of standards improves the 
product quality and the development process quality.  
 
The Use of standards increases the customers trust in products. In Figure 34 60 % of 
the organisations believed that the use of standards increased the product trust, 
while 30 % disagreed. Thus most of the organisations believed that use of standard 
would increase the product trust. 
 
Organisations have much focus on standards both in the organisation and in the 
market. In Figure 35 it seems that the focus on use of standards and in the 
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organisation is quite even7. It can not be assumed that organisations have much 
focus on standards in the market and in the organisation. 
 
Conclusion. Is there a need for good IT-security standards among organisations? A 
decisive element that decides this is the organisations clients demand and require 
for quality systems. From the results most organisations believe that the use of 
standard increases the products trust, quality and development process quality. 
Thus it is not much doubt that use of good standards improves the product. But 
organisations would probably not use it before their clients demand it. Half of the 
organisations have customers that demand the use of standards, but they probably 
do not require it. Another element that probably has influence on the need for 
standard is money. As presented in Figure 35 65 % of the organisations believed that 
the use of standards implies more training of the employees (and time is money for 
organisations).  
This survey has shown that it is various whether organisations follow or are 
certified by standards. Most of the standards presented in the questionnaire were 
unknown for the organisations and only one, ISO 17799, were followed by more 
than half of the organisations. Beyond half of the organisations answered that the 
use of standards becomes more and more important. A require for IT-security 
standard would increase because organisations focus on security have become more 
widespread. The need for good standards is various among the organisation. As 
long as use of standards is not demanded by the organisations customers, the use of 
standards would probably not increase in the future. 
To summarise the need for good IT-security standards is increasing. It will 
become more important in the future. At present there it is probably only required 
by the security critical organisations.
                                                 
7
 50 % of the organisations have a high focus on use of standards in the organisations while 40 % do 
not and 40 % focus on the use of standards in the market, while seven 35 % do not. 
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Chapter 8                                   
Discussion 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether we have managed to fulfil success 
criteria given in Chapter 3. For simplicity they are repeated below:  
 
THE THESIS SUCCESS CRITERIA: 
 The field trial in Agresso is successful if we are able to evaluate CORAS with 
respect to whether: 
o The CORAS UML profile supports and simplifies the analysis 
process  
o The CORAS tool increases the quality and efficiency of an analysis  
o Use of the CORAS RMP improves the quality of the organisations’ 
system 
 The IT-security standard survey is successful if we are able to evaluate 
whether:  
o CORAS is based on the standards most commonly used in practice  
o There is an increasing use and need for IT-security standards 
 
The chapter is structured after the thesis success criteria.  
8.1 The CORAS field trial in Agresso – A 
success? 
This section discusses the success criteria for the field trial in Agresso. Below 
follows a discussion of the evaluation from Chapter 6.2.3, Chapter 6.3.2 and 
Chapter 6.4.3. The sections include a discussion of the tested hypotheses, the 
hypotheses limitation and a conclusion of the success criterion discussed.  
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8.1.1 The CORAS UML profile supports and simplifies the 
analysis process  
The intention with the CORAS UML profile is to simplify and support the analysis 
process. This includes CORAS UML profile to be comprehensible for all parts 
involved in an analysis. During an analysis process risk terms, icons and different 
types of diagrams are used with the aim to support the documentation and simplify 
the understanding of the system. The evaluation that contributes to this discussion 
is given in Section 6.2.3.  
8.1.1.1 The tested hypotheses 
There were formulated two hypotheses according to the CORAS UML profile. The 
main findings of the hypotheses are given below. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Terms and icons used in CORAS are intelligible for all parts 
involved in the analysis. According to the analysis team it appears from the result 
that the terms and icons used in CORAS are intelligible for all parts involved in the 
analysis. The results were satisfying and all the sub-statements were answered. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The unwanted incidents and treatment diagrams are easy to 
understand and support the analysis process. Because of the lacking results not all 
of the hypothesis sub-statements were fully answered. We can not fully verify that 
the unwanted incidents and treatment diagrams are simple to understand and 
support the analysis process. Anyway it seems like the participants had no problem 
understanding the models. The result also showed that the models improved the 
communication and thus supported the analysis process.  
 
These hypotheses only partly answer whether the CORAS UML profile supports 
and simplifies the analysis process. There are three main purposes with the use of 
CORAS UML profile; support the communication, document risks, reuse of risks. 
The two hypotheses above only covered whether the profile were comprehensible 
and supported the communication. The process answering all the three purposes 
would require a longer research. As we see from the security analysis report in 
Appendix D, the diagrams were also used to document the results. In addition the 
organisation can use this experience and report in other similar analyses. If the 
report is easy to read and understand it will increase the chance of reuse.  But there 
exist no evidence whether the analysis participants believed the documentation 
were good and would reuse it in other cases. 
8.1.1.2 Limitations 
The verification of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 has some limitations. We can 
not decide that the hypotheses hold in all cases. We can only verify that it holds in 
this case and for this analysis team. 
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In the evaluation of Hypothesis 1 the results propose that the team believed the 
icons and terms were simple to understand. The result only contained terms and 
icons used in this analysis not all the terms and icons CORAS suggest to use. Thus 
this statement is limited to hold for the terms and icons used in this analysis. 
 
A limitation to the Hypothesis 2 that could have influence on the result is the 
analyst leader’s’ ability to communicate and explain the models. A vague 
explanation of the CORAS‘s diagrams and lack of explanation may affect the 
analysis. The terms should be explained to clarify the meaning between the analysis 
participants. The analysis started with a short introduction to CORAS with 
explanation of CORAS’s related terms and icons. The results may be different if 
CORAS was not introduced. Another issue is whether the participants’ knowledge 
of UML will affect the analysis participants understanding of CORAS diagrams. 
 
Finally the number of limitations that need to be considered: 
 
 The result of the participants understanding of the terms and icons only holds 
for the concepts used in this analysis 
 The participants knowledge of UML 
 The analyst leaders ability to explain the models 
 
8.1.1.3 Conclusion 
In general we believe that use of models in an analysis is good. It is easier for 
participants to point out their viewpoints in models. The question is whether the 
CORAS UML profile is good enough to support and simplify the analysis process. 
CORAS inherits much from the UML modelling language and suggest using UML 
models in addition to the CORAS specific models. The use of UML is increasing. 
The understanding of the diagrams can be difficult for people that are not familiar 
with the CORAS diagrams. We do not know the CORAS customers and their 
background of UML. Therefore an idea is to simplify the UML models to fit all 
possible analysis participants. Table 12 in Chapter 6.2.1.3 shows that one of the 
analysis participants find it difficult to understand the CORAS diagrams while 
another find the diagrams mostly self-explanatory. It could be due to their 
knowledge of UML. 
 
We can not verify whether the CORAS UML profile supports and simplifies the 
analysis process. The Hypothesis 1 holds in this case.  The Hypothesis 2 remains 
unanswered because of the lack of result. In addition there could be formulated 
other hypotheses in order to be able to verify or falsify the success criterion.   
8.1.2 The CORAS tool increases the quality and efficiency of 
an analysis  
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The purpose of the CORAS tool is to assist the analyst leader during an analysis, 
both in documentation and to efficiency the process. The tool was used by the 
analyst leader as a guide and to document the result. The evaluation that contributes 
to this discussion is given in Section 6.3.2. 
 
8.1.2.1 The tested hypotheses 
In order to evaluate the CORAS tool there were formulated one hypothesis, 
Hypothesis 3. The main findings of this hypothesis are presented below. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The CORAS tool improves the analysis and increase the efficient 
of the analysis. This hypothesis with the belonging sub-statements was fully 
answered. The evaluation verifies that the tool does not satisfy its purpose. The 
intention is good but there exist many errors and lacks (see Table 16) that need to 
be fixed. Thus the CORAS tool version 2.0.1 is not supporting the analysis process. 
Instead of increase the efficiency of the analysis process, the tool rather slows it 
down. The many errors and deficiencies prevented the performance.  
 
The analysis report created from the tool could not be used. The entire security 
analysis report document (in Appendix D) had to be reformatted which delayed the 
delivery of the report.  
8.1.2.2 Limitations 
The results and evaluation of the tool was performed by one person, the analyst 
leader. Different people with different background would differently judge the tool. 
In order to verify the result the tool should be tested by several persons. The tool 
should have larger scope of people to test it before decide the final conclusion. To 
get as good result as possible the tool should during the development process be 
eventually tested. 
8.1.2.3 Conclusion 
The idea of a tool to support an analysis is brilliant. Analysis distinguishes from 
each other. The people involved and the kind of system would lead the analyses in 
different directions. Thus the tool has to fit the needs of each analysis. If the 
analysis team want to add own specific models to the documentation the tool 
should support this. In addition if it is a need to change one of the tables used, the 
tool should also support this.  
Sometimes people desire only to draw arrows and boxes, thus the CORAS editor 
should fit this purpose. Adding own icons to the editor should be appended as well. 
In addition allow to rearrange the order of the tables, or leave out some of the tables 
or drawings when creating the report.  
There are a lot of actions that can be performed to improve a tool. The most 
important thing is probably to make people use it. Some of the most important 
criteria for make people use the tool is that it has to be flexible, easy to learn and 
use. 
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The CORAS tool did not satisfy the analyst leader’s expectation. At this point in 
time, the tool does not increase the quality and efficiency of an analysis. The 
CORAS tool is not flexible enough and consists of many lacks and errors, but it is 
easy to learn and use (according to the analyst leader). There is no need to 
formulate additional hypotheses to further answer the success criterion. 
8.1.3 Use of the CORAS RMP improves the quality of the 
organisations’ system 
The CORAS RMP is the guideline for identify risks. The purpose is to help 
organisations identify threats and vulnerabilities in their system. The main aim of 
CORAS is to offer a framework that would assist and support the organisation to 
create good quality systems. The evaluation that contributes to this discussion is 
given in Chapter 6.3.2. 
 
 
8.1.3.1 The tested hypotheses 
There were formulated two hypotheses in order to evaluate parts of the risk 
management process. The main findings of these hypotheses are given below. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4: The CORAS customer was pleased and would continue use 
CORAS in the future. The hypothesis could not be verified with confidence, 
because the lacking results. The hypothesis sub-statement could not be directly 
related to the hypothesis and if the sub-statement was answered or not, we could 
not verify the hypothesis. Therefore to answer the hypothesis, the sub-statements 
should be reformulated. 
The process of perform an analysis and at the same time accomplish a research 
of it is time consuming. Therefore it is not realistic to get an answer to this 
hypothesis. The result of the analysis would be carefully discussed by Agresso in 
order to decide whether to continue using CORAS.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 5 The result and the accomplishment of the analysis meetings were 
good. In order to fully verify this hypothesis it probably could be gathered more 
information. The result showed that the communication of the meeting was good 
and there were an appropriate number of participants. In order to answer and 
improve the hypothesis it should be considered whether the number of meetings 
was appropriate, the meetings results were satisfying or if the efficiency of the 
analysis meetings were good. The general accomplishment of the meetings was 
satisfying. It was the accomplishment of these meetings that lead to the security 
analysis result (Appendix D).  
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There should be formulated additional hypotheses that contribute answering 
whether the CORAS RMP improves the quality of the organisations system. There 
are several factors that could be related to the quality of a system, not only whether 
the analysis meetings were good and whether the organisation would continue used 
CORAS in the future. Probably the most important thing before performing an 
analysis is to investigate the organisation expectations of a quality system.  
The analysis report gives a good documentation of the PunchOut functionality. 
For an organisation like Agresso it is important of good documentation that will 
contribute for new developers to easy understand earlier work accomplished on the 
system. Good documentation could give PunchOut a higher quality in the future 
development. Thus CORAS may have contributed to improve the quality of the 
PunchOut functionality’s next version.  
Even if we could not fully answer the success criterion of whether CORAS 
improves the quality of the system, the result of the analysis shows that there exist 
some risks with the functionality. If the developers of PunchOut treat these risks the 
functionality is improved. Thus CORAS has supported in improving the quality. 
 
8.1.3.2 Limitations 
In addition to IT-systems, CORAS could also be involved in other critical systems. 
There is a possibility that CORAS would be significant in one system, but poor in 
other systems. We need to gain knowledge of different types of systems and 
perform different types of analyses. This thesis is limited to one IT-system.  
 
The results from Figure 28 indicate that in general the analysis team believed the 
analysis were efficiency. A limitation to this could be that we do not know how 
each participant defines efficiency. Do they think of efficiency according to other 
analyses or is it according to the entire development process or is it according to 
their expectations of how efficient the analysis should be. The definition of the 
efficiency in the analysis should be emphasized. 
8.1.3.3 Conclusion 
There are many factors in an analysis that plays a role when improving the quality 
of a system. The main purpose is to be able to find all risks in a system and let the 
organisation decide whether to solve these risks. This does not only depend on the 
risk analysis method used. In the cooperation with the organisation, the analyst 
leader’s ability to disseminate messages and direct the team into right track plays 
an important role of the ability to find risks. To guide the analyst leader it could be 
useful to have a guideline with tips and tricks in addition to the already available 
checklists.  
It is not possible to remember all earlier analyses. Thus it is important to have a 
good experience library where the analyst leader (and the team?) can easily take 
advantage of similar cases.  
There are several factors that decide the quality of a product. In order to improve 
the system quality we need to find these factors. We need to find out the 
organisations opinion of quality.  
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In order to answer the success criterion it should be considered the factors that 
improve the quality of the CORAS risk management process and the factors that 
improve the quality of a system.   
 
The result and evaluation of the CORAS RMP is not verified. It is not possible to 
verify whether the use of CORAS RMP improves the quality of the organisations 
system, not even in the AGRESSO POF. In order to verify this success criterion 
there should exist additional results. With basis in the analysis report we can only 
assume that CORAS improves the quality of the PunchOut functionality.  
8.2 The IT-security survey investigation – A 
success? 
This section discusses the investigation of CORAS according to IT-security 
standards and the use of IT-security standards. The evaluation that contributes to 
this discussion is given in Chapter 7.3. 
8.2.1 CORAS is based on the standards most commonly used 
in practice  
The CORAS inherits much from IT-security standards. If organisations are known 
with the standards CORAS is based on, it is a probability that they know the 
concepts used in the CORAS. This section discussed the evaluation of the CORAS 
is based on known and used standards. 
8.2.1.1 The tested hypotheses 
There was formulated one hypothesis in order to answer whether the standards used 
in the CORAS are the same as used in practice.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 6 The CORAS framework is based on standards already in use  
among organisations. Generally the IT-security standards in the questionnaire were 
not known. Among the four IT-security standards CORAS is based on, two of the 
standards stand out as more known. The ISO 17799 standard, were used by more 
than half of the organisations. The AS/NZS 4360 standard were also known among 
several of the organisation, but not used.  
8.2.1.2 Limitations 
A number of limitations should to be considered. A limit is that the scope of 
organisations participated in the survey was too small to draw finite conclusion. In 
order to get significant results the scope should be more than twenty organisations. 
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Among twenty participated organisations most were private. The result could be 
different with a dominance of public organisations. The majority of the 
organisations were large8. A larger organisation is usually more vulnerable than 
small organisation, e.g. because the possibility for unfaithful employees increases 
with the organisation size. This also could have affected the result.  
Would the organisations type of customers affect organisation decision to IT-
security standards? If customers do not demand organisations to use IT-security 
standards, organisations may not focus on using standards. E.g. a hospital may have 
more strict requirement to IT-security and risk management than an organisation 
where an security breach do not affect the organisation or the customer. Another 
factor that may have influence of the result is if the organisation is international or 
have international customers. Would foreign countries have strict requirements to 
the use of standards? 
In order to limit the results the questionnaire should be limited with: 
 
 Organisations type  
 Organisations size 
 Organisations customer 
 Internationalisation  
 
8.2.1.3 Conclusion 
The use of standards in organisations seems to be rare. Among the nineteen IT-
security standards mentioned in the questionnaire only a minority is used by the 
organisations. This indicates that just a few IT-security standards are widely used, 
but the most used is (according to the survey) ISO 17799, a standard CORAS is 
based on.  The limitations of this survey is generally restricted to private 
organisations with more than or equal to three hundred employees. If we 
accomplish a survey with limited to small, public organisations, would the outcome 
be different?  
The ISO 17799 is not the standard CORAS inherits most from. It is the 
Australian standard AS/NZS 4360. The survey indicates that most organisations 
have not heard of this standard. Among the twenty organisations only one 
organisation follow the standard. The AS/NZS 4360 standard should have been 
more known and used before we can conclude that CORAS is based on the 







                                                 
8
 More or equal to three-hundred employees 
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8.2.2 There is an increasing use and need for IT-security 
standards 
Even if it does not exists any interest or need for IT-security standards at present, 
there may be in the future. This section discusses the evaluation of whether there is 
an increasing use and need for such standards (presented in 7.3). 
8.2.2.1 The tested hypotheses 
There was formulated one hypothesis to answer if there is an increasing use of IT-
security standards.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 7 There is a need for good IT-security standards among 
organisations. According to the evaluation there is an increasing need for IT-
security standards, but at present there are probably most used by organisations that 
require strong security (e.g. the health sector). Almost half of the organisations had 
customers that demand use of standards. Although the organisations did not used 
the IT-security standards, but they saw the benefit of using standards. 
 
In order to answer the success criteria there should be added another hypothesis. It 
does not clearly appear that there is an increasing use of IT-security standards. A 
new formulated hypothesis should contain whether the organisations intend to 
follow IT-security standards in the future. 
8.2.2.2 Limitations 
The limitation of this result is the same as the limitations described in Section 
8.2.1.2. 
8.2.2.3 Conclusion 
The need for secure system is increasing. The market gets more vulnerable for 
attackers (both unfaithful employees and competitors). Thus it is reasonable to 
believe that organisations look for security measure to protect their system. One 
measure could be to follow or use IT-security standards that will result in more use 
of IT-security standards. Use of standards in a short-term is probably expensive, but 
in the long-term it will be worthy. Most of the organisations believed that use of 
standards would increase the organisations cost in time and training the employees. 
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Chapter 9                                      
Further work 
This chapter gives the recommendation for further work. In order to bring the 
experience of this research further, it will be suggested modifications to each part 
of investigation and additional suggestion to improve and continue the work of this 
thesis.  
9.1 The CORAS framework 
This section recommends further work of the CORAS UML profile, the CORAS 
tool and the CORAS RMP. 
9.1.1 The CORAS UML profile 
The Hypothesis 2 was not fully answered. To continue the work it should be 
answered. In addition to the two hypotheses formulated it is recommended to 
formulate a third hypothesis in order to investigate whether the CORAS UML 
profile gives good documentation and supports reuse in a good way.  To continue 
the investigation of whether the CORAS UML profile supports and simplifies the 
analysis process there are several factors that could be considered. Thus the further 
research might be amended by observing: 
 
 Whether the analysis participants knowledge of UML affect the 
understanding of the models used in the analysis. 
 Whether the analyst leader’s explanation of the CORAS UML profile 
affected the understanding.  
 Find out what makes the CORAS’s diagrams and icons difficult to understand 
and what makes them simple to understand.  
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9.1.2 The CORAS tool 
The CORAS tool should be tested continuous with releases of new versions. The 
tool should also be tested by several potential users with different needs and 
requirements. Before the adjustment of the deficiencies and errors found in this 
thesis, the results need to be tested by a larger scope of people. The same 
observations as used in this thesis could be used. The observations for further 
research should be: 
 
 The learning process 
 The use of the CORAS methodology guide that follows the tool 
 The use of the tools functionalities (tables, diagram editor, report generator) 
9.1.3 The CORAS risk management process 
It is difficult to test whether the CORAS RMP improves the quality of the 
organisations system. In order to complete the investigation in this thesis the 
formulated hypotheses of CORAS RMP need to be amended. In addition there 
should be formulated new hypotheses. The new formulated hypotheses should 
consider factors that contribute to make a quality system. For instance answer 
whether the CORAS RMP contributed to: 
 
 Find any critical risks 
 Increase the system performance 
 Prevent unauthorized to receive confidential information  
 Preserve the system integrity 
 Preserve a available system 
 Achieve good system documentation 
 
Performing an analysis require finding out the organisation’s intention with the 
analysis. What factors increases the quality of the system?  
The CORAS RMP will not achieve a satisfying result if the elements (e.g. 
analysis meetings, team composition) in the process were not satisfactory.  
Thus future work might investigate: 
 
 What factors improve a system? 
 Investigate whether the elements in an analysis will improve the risk 
management process 
 
In addition, the CORAS RMP should be performed on different types of systems.  
9.2 CORAS according to IT-security standards 
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This section recommends further work to the survey of CORAS according to IT-
security standards.  
 
In the future there should be accomplished several surveys to support the evaluation 
of this research. The same experience with use of questionnaire could be used. The 
questionnaire (Appendix B) should be improved by adding an option, “har hørt om 
den”, to the last table in the questionnaire (see Table 27)9.  
 








Vi er ikke 
sertifisert, 
men baserer 







BS 7799 / ISO 27001 / NS 
7799 
    
ISO 15408 – The Common 
Criteria  
    
ISO 20000/BS 15000 - IT 
service management 
    
IEC 61508     
ISO 9000 family     
IC 9700 Enterprise Certification     
IC 9200 Small business 
Certification 
    
Table 27 Missing option in questionnaire 
 
For possible future study limitations to the result should be considered. The scope 
of organisations could be categorised into; organisation size, type, customer, 
internationalisation, and the degree of software development. If we manage to 
gather result divided after these categories we can compare each result to see 
whether these factors influence the organisations need and use of IT-security 
standards. Whether there are different opinions about standards among 
organisations in the public sector than the private sector might be interesting to see. 
To summarise, the limits to consider in further work: 
 
 Organisations size 
 Organisations type (public, private, other) 
 Internationalisation  
 Organisations customer 
 The degree of software development (in Norway and in foreign countries) 
 
A challenge in the further process is to be able to gather information from 
organisations. The process of gathering questionnaire results is time consuming. 
The investigator should be prepared to an early start.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 The Table 27 is a part of the questionnaire that were performed and written in Norwegian, thus it is 
not translated to English and have different formatting.  
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Chapter 10                                     
Conclusion 
This chapter presents a short summary of the thesis and the main result of 
evaluation.  
10.1 Summary 
The goal of the research was to continue the research of CORAS with the purpose 
of evaluate and improve the CORAS framework. The research consisted of two 
main investigations: 
 
 Investigate parts of the CORAS framework 
 Investigate organisations use and need of IT-security standards 
 
In order to limit the research there were created thesis success criteria. The main 
purpose of this research was to evaluate these success criteria. To be able to answer 
the success criteria a number of hypotheses were formulated. This paper has given 
an account for the evaluation of these hypotheses and a discussion of whether the 
thesis success criteria are fulfilled. The hypotheses were compared with evidence 
from two investigations:  
 
 A field trial in the Agresso organisation: A full security analysis of industrial 
scale was accomplished in the Agresso organisation. During the analysis 
results were collected.   
 An IT-security standards survey: Twenty organisations answered a 
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10.2 Results  
The result of the discussion and evaluation of the two investigations are presented 
in the table below. Each investigation part summarise the main result, limitation 




The result shows that in general there are no 
particular problem understanding the 
CORAS UML profile or any terms and 
icons used within an analysis.  
Will the participant’s knowledge of UML 
have influence on the understanding of 
CORAS UML profile? 
Limitations 
Will the analyst leader’s ability to explain 
the models affect the understanding of 
CORAS UML profile? 
The CORAS UML 
profile 
Further Work To investigate what influence the 
understanding of the CORAS UML profile. 
Results The result shows that the tool is not 
satisfying. There exist several errors and 
deficiency. But if these flaws are corrected 
the tool would probably be satisfying. 
Limitation Will other analyst leaders have the same 
experience as this thesis analyst leader? 
The CORAS tool 
Further Work Test the errors and deficiencies found. 
Perform the same test on each version of 
CORAS.  
Results The results indicate that there were difficult 
to decide whether CORAS RMP improves 
the quality of the organisation’s system. To 
be able to consider whether CORAS RMP 
increases the quality there is need for several 
hypotheses that cover all the aspects of a 
quality system and whether these aspects 
were improved by using CORAS RMP. 
 The security analysis shows that it is 
possible to perform a security analysis with 
the CORAS RMP and get satisfying results.  
Limitation Is CORAS equally suited for other than IT 
systems? 
Investigate what factors improve a system. 
The CORAS RMP 
Further Work 
Investigate what elements in the analysis 
that will contribute to improve the analysis 
process.  
CORAS according to Results The uses of IT-security standards among the 
Conclusion  97                                                                                                                                                                   
  
twenty participated organisations are rare. 
The standards that are most commonly used 
by organisations CORAS are based on these 
standards.  
Organisations are more aware of security 
risks. But still they believe that there use of 
IT-security standards increases the expenses 
in the organisation.  
Will the organisation type and size influence 
the organisations use of standard? 
Will the organisations’ customer affect the 
organisations use of standards?  
Limitation 
Will organisations degree of contact with 
foreign countries (internationalisation) affect 
the use of standards? 
IT-security standards 
Further work Perform the same survey among a number 
of organisations and emphasise the 
limitations.  
Table 28 Main result of the investigations 
 
These results showed that we were able to find improvements with CORAS which 
brings the investigation of CORAS to the next level.  
 
The aim of this thesis was to answer whether 1)the CORAS field trial was a success 
and 2) whether there is a need for such a guideline in the future.  
The CORAS field trial in Agresso a success? The analysis report showed that it 
was possible to use CORAS to complete a security analysis in Agresso. If Agresso 
treat the risks found, the PunchOut functionality will be improved. Even if we were 
able to finish an analysis the results of the investigation show that there CORAS 
could be improved in order to achieve good results.  
Is CORAS needed among organisations in the future? The IT-security standard 
investigation showed that organisations are more concerned with security now than 
ever before. In addition, the evaluation shows that there is an increasing need for 
tools that will guide organisations in improving the quality of their system. 
 
This thesis has shown that CORAS was successful in an organisation and that it is 
reasonable to believe that there is a need for good security guidelines, such as 
CORAS, in the future.  
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Appendix A                                            
Agresso field trial surveys 
 
 
A.1 Questionnaire 1 
 
Evaluering av møte 
 









Tror du sikkerhets analyse er nyttig? 
Ja alltid  
I noen tilfeller  
Nei, aldri  
Nyttig, men koster for mye tid og penger.  
Annet: 
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Kjenner du til disse begrepene i sikkerhets sammenheng?(1= Har aldri hørt 
begrepet, 5= Vet godt betydningen av begrepet) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Aktiva      
Uønsket hendelse      
Trussel      
Sårbarhet      
Risiko      
Konfidensialitet      
Integritet      
Tilgjengelighet      
      
 
Hvor enig er du om disse påstandene for møte (1= helt uenig, 5 = helt enig) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Møte var for langt      
Diskusjonene ble for lange      
Kommunikasjonen mellom deltakerene var 
bra 
     
Jeg fikk frem mine synspunkter      
Det ble for mange nye begreper      
Analyselederens lederegenskaper var gode      
Presentasjonen var oversiktlig      
 


































1 Var det noen av iconene som var vanskeligere å skjønne enn andre? 
 
2 Var det noen uttrykk som var vanskeligere å forstå enn andre? 
 
3 Hva synes du om trussel/uønskede handelses diagrammene? 
 
4 Er diagrammene en bra måte fremstille trusler å uønskede hendelser på? 
 
5 Hva synes du om kommunikasjonen på møtene? 
 
6 Hva synes du om team sammensetningen? Burde det vært flere/færre? 
 
7 Hva synes du om analyse leders forklaring av iconene og diagrammene? Burde 
den vært   
tidligere? 
 
8 Hva synes du om risiko identifiserings møte? var det effektivt? Burde andre enn 
teamet være involvert? 
 
9 Hvor lang tid hadde du trodd det ville ta å gjenomføre en slik analyse? 
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A.3 Questionnaire 2 
 
 
Evaluering av analysen 
 




Ingen forventninger  
Kommentar 
 
Burde Agresso ha flere slike analyser? 
Ja  
På noen prosjekter  
Nei, Det koster for mye  
Nei, Det tar for lang tid  
Vet ikke  
 
Hvilken fase av utviklings prosessen synes du det er mest nyttig med en 
sikkerhets analyse? 
Alle  
Før design (starten av prosjektet)  
Før implementasjon  
Etter at mesteparten av implementasjon er ferdig  
Når systemet er ferdig  
Kommentar: 
 




Vet ikke  
Kommentar: 
 
Fungerte teamet bra? 
 Enig Delvis Uenig Vet ikke 
Kommunikasjon mellom team 
deltagerne var bra  
    
Antall deltagere i teamet var 
passe 
    
Ulike kvalifikasjonene blant 
team deltagerne gjorde analysen 
bedre 
    
Ulike kvalifikasjonene gjorde     
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kommunikasjon vanskelig 
Det var noen som snakket 
betydelig mer ennandre 
    
Alle ble hørt     
 
 
Antall deltagere i teamet burde være(sett et kryss) 
Mindre enn 5  
5-6  




Hvor enig er du i disse påatandene om CORAS diagrammene (1=helt uenig. 5 
helt enig): 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Bruk av diagrammer gjorde 
kommunikasjonen enklere 
     
Den grafiske fremstillingen var vanskelig å 
skjønne 
     
Bruk av diagrammer har ingen betydning      
Bruk av diagrammer forbedrer analysen 
betydelig 
     
Bruk av diagrammer efiktiviserer analysen      
Diagrammene gjør det enklere å se nye 
risikoer i systemet 
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Appendix B                                                
IT-security standard questionnaire 
 
Standarder innen IT-sikkerhet 
 
Litt om din organisasjon: 
 
1. Hvor mange ansatte er dere?   Færre enn 25  26-100  101-300  Over 300 
 
2. Hva slags type organisasjon?  Privat  Offentlig  Annet 
 
3. Hva slags kunder/samarbeidspartnere har dere? 
 Mest fra offentlig sektor  Mest fra privat sektor  Like mange fra hver 
 
4. I hvilken grad driver dere med softwareutvikling i Norge? 
 Ingenting  Lite  En 
del 
 Mye  Alt gjøres her til lands 
 
Hvor enig er du i disse påstandene om bruken av standarder (1=helt enig - 
5=helt uenig)? 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Bruken av standarder har blitt mer og mer viktig      
Det er etterspurt/krav av internasjonale kunder og 
samarbeidspartnere 
     
Det er etterspurt/krav av norske kunder og 
samarbeidspartnere 
     
Det gjør oss mer konkurransedyktige      
Det gir økt tillit til produktet vårt      
Utviklingsprosessen tar lenger tid når man må basere seg på 
standarder 
     
Det bedrer kvaliteten på utviklingsprosessen      
Det bedrer kvaliteten på produktet vårt      
Standardisering innebærer ekstra opplæring av ansatte      
Man får ikke nok igjen for å basere seg på standarder      
Det er mye fokus på standarder i vår organisasjon      
Det er mye fokus på standarder i vårt marked      
 
En del standarder kan man sertifiseres etter, mens andre kan man følge mer 
som retningslinjer, i hvilken grad brukes disse sta
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Vi er ikke 
sertifisert, 
men baserer 







BS 7799 / ISO 27001 / NS 
7799 
    
ISO 15408 – The Common 
Criteria  
    
ISO 20000/BS 15000 - IT 
service management 
    
IEC 61508     
ISO 9000 family     
IC 9700 Enterprise Certification     
IC 9200 Small business 
Certification 
    
 
Standarder: 
 ISO 21827: Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model 
 ISO 13335: IT security management - comprises a set of guidelines for 
the management of IT security, focusing primarily on technical security 
control measures 
 ISO 17799 (ISO 27001): this is the Code of Practice describing a 
comprehensive set of information security control objectives and outlines 
a menu of best-practice security controls. 
 ISO 10007:  Quality management systems – Guidelines for configuration 
management  
 ISO/IEC 12207: Software life cycle processes  
 ISO/IEC 14516: Guidelines for the use and management of Trusted Third 
Party services 
 ISO 15489-1: Information and documentation – Records management 
 ISO/IEC 18028-4: Securing remote access 
 ISO/IEC TR 18044: Information security incident management 
 ISO/IEC 16085: Software life cycle processes - Risk management 
 AS/NZS 4360: Australian / New Zealand Standard for Risk Management 
 ISO 19011: Guidelines for quality and /or environmental management 
systems auditing 
Standarder man kan følge (se i listen 
bak for fullt navn): 
Følger 
standarden 





ISO 21827    
ISO 13335     
ISO 17799 (ISO 27002)    
ISO 10007     
ISO/IEC 12207    
ISO/IEC 14516    
ISO 15489-1    
ISO/IEC 18028-4    
ISO/IEC TR 18044    
ISO 19011     
ISO/IEC 16085    
AS/NZS 4360    
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 BS 7799 (ISO 27001/NS 7799): the main Information Security 
Management System requirements standard (specification), against which 
organisations will be certified.  
 ISO 15408: Common Criteria. ISO 15408:1999 describes the Common 
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation. Products that are 
evaluated against the Common Criteria have a defined level of assurance 
as to their information security capabilities that is recognised in most of 
the world. 
 ISO 20000: - ITIL - IT Service Management - “ITIL (IT Infrastructure 
Library) is the most widely accepted approach to IT Service Management 
in the world. ITIL provides a cohesive set of best practice, drawn from the 
public and private sectors internationally. It is supported by a 
comprehensive qualifications scheme, accredited training organisations, 
and implementation and assessment tools.   ITIL standard BS 15000 has 
now become ISO 20000, a two part standard. 
 ISO 9000-3: Guidelines for the application of ISO 9001 to the 
development, supply and maintenance of software covers software 
engineering, guiding the application of ISO 9000, the quality assurance 
standards, to the systems development process. 
 IEC 61508: is the international standard for electrical, electronic and 
programmable electronic safety related systems. It sets out the 
requirements for ensuring that systems are designed, implemented, 
operated and maintained to provide the required safety integrity level 
(SIL). 
 IC 9700: is a high level business certification. As opposed to ISO 9001, 
the IC9700 standard certifies a companies internal processes, ethical 
guide measures and ensures the company operates good practice 
principals. 
 IC 9200: is a popular small business certification program and is 
regulated by the Small Business Certification. 
 
BS = British Standard, NS = Norsk Standard, ISO = the International 
Organisation for Standardisation, IEC = the International Electrotechnical 
Commission, IC = International Charter. 
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Appendix C                                   
Introduction to the CORAS UML 
profile 
UML is the most widely used specification language in the software industry today. 
A UML Profile is a refinement of the basic UML10 language targeting a more 
specialised application area. The CORAS project has defined a UML profile for 
security risk assessment. The CORAS UML profile is a UML based specification 
language targeting security risk assessment. It suggest to use UML to describe the 
target of analysis and use CORAS own graphical language to model risks.  The 
models for security assessment are used to document the threats, unwanted 
incidents and risks. [2]  
The CORAS UML profile is used in every step in the analysis. In the context 
identification process the CORAS UML Profile suggest using known UML 
techniques as use cases and sequence diagrams. In the risk identification process 
CORAS graphical language is used. 
 
The advantages of  modelling risks and threats is that it will reduce 
misunderstandings, graphical icons is faster to read than text and it is probably 
intelligible for all inexperience parts involved.   
 
The CORAS UML profile defines specialised diagrams and modelling elements to 
support the security risk analysis process and it is based on the UML standard. In 






                                                 
10
 For more information about UML see http://www.uml.org 
Appendix C  111    
           
            
Unwanted incident/threat diagrams 
 
The Table B 1 presents the threat and unwanted incidents icons used when 
modelling unwanted incidents. 
 
Icon Name Description 
 
Threat agent A potential cause of an unwanted 
incident, which may result in harm 
to a system or organisation and its 
assets. Threat agents can be 
external, (e.g., hackers or viruses) 
or internal (e.g., system failures or 
disloyal employees). [2] 
 
Threat scenario A description of how a threat may 
lead to an unwanted incident. [2] 
 
 
Unwanted incident An undesired event that may reduce 
the value of an asset. [2] 
 
Asset Something to which an organization 
directly assigns value and, hence, 




Vulnerability A weakness with respect to an asset 
or group of assets that can be 
exploited by one or more threats. 
[2] 
Table B 1 CORAS threat and unwanted incidens icons 
 
Unwanted incidents diagrams consist of threats and unwanted incidents. A threat is 
modelled using the threat agent and threat scenario. The threat scenario may be 
caused by a weakness, vulnerability, in the system that the treat agent can exploit. 
The threat agent (e.g. eavesdropper or malicious person) present the active part of 
the threat and the threat scenario is behaviour of the threat agent. A threat scenario 
may lead to an unwanted incident. The threats and the unwanted incidents are 
related to the assets they threat.  
 
Figure B 1 illustrates an example of how to create unwanted incident diagram. 
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In Table B 2 there is presented a description of the treatment icons for modelling 
treatment diagrams.  
 
Icon Name Description 
 
Treatment Ways of reducing the 




Treatment effect A treatment’s capability 
to reduce the risk value 
of a particular risk. [2] 
 
Table B 2 CORAS treatment icon 
 
The treatment diagram suggests treatment to the unwanted incidents.  A treatment 
can be viewed as a protection against a risk. There are different categories of 
treatment [1]: 
 
 Avoid the unwanted incidents 
 Transfer the unwanted incident to some other target 
 Reduce likelihood of the unwanted incidents 
 Reduce consequence of the unwanted incidents 
 
In Figure B 2 gives an example of how to add treatment to the unwanted incident 
diagram from Figure B 1. 
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Figure B 2 Example of treatment of unwanted incident
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The Agresso security analysis report 
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Analysis method CORAS risk management process 
 
Author Jenny B. Hougen 
 
Client Agresso R&D 
 
Date:  20.04.2006 
 
Abstract This report documents the risks identified in the 
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Abbreviations 
Agresso: Agresso R&D. The Agresso term written in lower case points 
to the Agresso as company.   
 
ABW:    Agresso Business World, name of the complete product.  
 
AGRESSO:  The AGRESSO term written in upper case points to the 
AGRESSO product itself. 
 
AGRESSO POF:  AGRESSO PunchOut functionality 
 
AGRESSO PO:  AGRESSO PunchOut 
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Executive summary 
This report documents the results from the security analysis conducted of the 
AGRESSO POF. The goal with the analysis was to improve the security in the 
functionality. To complete the security analysis the CORAS model-based risk 
assessment framework were used and the steps and suggested activities of the 
CORAS RMP were followed. 
 
The viewpoint for the analysis was the Agresso organisation. There were identified 
values in the AGRESSO POF that were of relevance for Agresso. These assets 
guided the rest of the analysis. The three main assets were: 
 




The aim of the risk identification was to find potential losses in the assets. The 
threats and unwanted incidents were identified by performing a HazOp analysis. 
During the risk identification process there were discovered totally 17 potential 
risks. To evaluate what risks to treat the risks were added consequence and 
frequency values. The risks were prioritised from their risk values. It was 
recommended treatment to the risks of high value.    
 
Recommended treatment to risks: 
 
Table D 1 Suggested treatment 
Risk 
ID 
Threat scenario Treatment Vulnerability Effect 
R1 User gets 
information about the 
system and uses this 
information to hack 
into AGRESSO.  
Information about 
DB 
About the web server 
Malicious person get 
database information 
and uses this 
information to log 

























information about the 
Assure that 
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system and uses this 
information to hack 
into AGRESSO.  
Information about 
DB 
About the web server 
Malicious person get 
database information 
and uses this 
information to log 
into the database and 
destroy information. 
turned off. 
Could create a 




















Debug mode is 
turned on, stack trace 
is available. 
Malicious person can 
use the error 
information to get 
valuable information 













In addition to the risks of high value there was also suggested treatment to the risks 
of medium value. These are presented in Table 1.  
  
There were decided to review the analysis with a different viewpoint. The new 
viewpoint would not focus on the Agresso organisation, but have more technical 
view. The asset values will be more directed to the AGRESSO POF. The aim is to 
find risks that are directly attached to the AGRESSO POF. 
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Chapter 1                                  
Introduction 
Security threats are a subject that worries several enterprises. The threats on 
distributed systems increase. By using standards for risk management and carry out 
risk analysis, organisations can improve the quality in their systems and avoid 
occurrence of potential risks. SINTEF has developed a model-based framework, 
CORAS, to identify and remedy security risks. 
 
Traditionally organizations system documentation focuses on the systems 
behaviour or functionality. However, it is equally important to document 
undesirable behaviour; what happens when things goes wrong? This report 
documents the threats and risks identified during the security analysis performed on 
the AGRESSO POF. It presents the objectives, the analysis team and plan, and an 
introduction to the CORAS MBRA (model-based risk assessment). 
1.1 Objectives of the analysis 
The analysis objective was to identify and analyse security risks related to the 
AGRESSO POF. The aim of CORAS is that it should be effective and easy to 
understand for all parts in an analysis involved and it should document threats and 
risks to the system that can cause undesirable behaviour. In order to evaluate the 
process there were collected feedback from the analysis participants. These 
evaluations would help the further research and improvement of CORAS.  
 
This analysis was the first security analysis field trial accomplished in Agresso. The 
Agresso objective was to find advantages of using similar methods in future 
projects.  If the Agresso participants find the method useful there is a wish to start 
using a simplified method in other similar projects. 
1.2 Team and plan for the analysis 
The analysis was carried out in the period January 2006 to March 2006 and 
managed by Jenny B. Hougen under supervision from SINTEF. In order to 
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accomplish the analysis an analysis team were compounded. The team consisted of 
people with different knowledge about the system. Table 2 gives an overview of the 
people involved in the security analysis and their role and background. 
  





Tor Gaute Indstøy Security expert, system designer, analysis secretary 
Erik Inge 
Marcussen 
Developer, AGRESSO framework expert 
Randi Bjørnbeth System designer 
Truls Tveøy System designer, developer 
Helge T. Blindheim Customer view 
 
To carry out the analysis and get a correct understanding of the target, it requires 
good communication between the analysis team. Structural meetings were 
accomplished. The required tasks and dates for the meetings are displayed the 
Table 3. 
 
Table D 3 Analysis Plan Table 





UML models with 
descriptions from the 
documentation given about 
the PunchOut requisition 
were prepared. The models 
were reviewed to get a 
clear understanding of the 
target. The second task for 
the meeting was to decide 
the rest of the team to 
participate in the analysis. 






The team were introduced 
and a short introduction to 
CORAS was applied. The 
participants went through 
the target models created 
by the analyst leader. The 
activity terminated when 
the team were satisfied with 
the target description. 
24.01.2006 Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Tor Gaute Indstøy, 







This meeting started with 
an approval from the last 
01.02.2006 Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
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Task ID Description Performed 
date 
Participants 
meeting. The participants 
were divided into two 
teams for accomplish a 
structured brainstorming. 
PunchOut documentation 
and checklist was handed 
out. Based on the hand outs 
the team should fill out the 
risk table. 







Continued the structured 
brainstorming. The activity 
terminated when the team 
could not find more risks. 
The participants went 
through each unwanted 
incident scenario found. 
08.02.2006 Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Tor Gaute Indstøy, 







The analyst leader had 
created CORAS unwanted 
incident diagrams. These 
were handed out. 
Consequence and 
frequency values were 
decided. The goal of the 
meeting was to determine 
consequence and frequency 
values to the unwanted 
incidents. 
14.03.2006 Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
Helge T. Blindheim, 




Continued applying the 
consequence and frequency 
to the unwanted incidents.  
20.03.2006 Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Tor Gaute Indstøy, 
Helge T. Blindheim, 
Truls Tveøy, Jenny 
Hougen 
Risk treatment Risk treatment approval 
and project closing. 
21.04.2006 Jenny Hougen, 
Randi Bjørnbeth, 
Tor Gaute Indstøy 
Erik Inge 
Marcussen, Truls 
Tveøy, Jan Åge 
Berg, Ida Camilla 
Egeland. 
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1.3 The CORAS framework for MBRA 
CORAS is a method for doing risk assessment of security critical systems. 
CORAS’s purpose is to help integrate security into system development. One of the 
main objectives of CORAS is to develop a practical framework to support and 
simplify risk management. The framework includes the result from use of 
experience library from previous projects, the methodology for doing risk 
assessment and terminology used in the projects. [2] 
The aim of a risk analysis is to suggest actions that will control the unwanted 
incidents (avoid or reduce the consequence of the unwanted incidents).  
 
“A threat is by definition dangerous and therefore important. When it comes to 
human beings, many threats are reflected instinctively. Any snake, even the non 
lethal ones, scares most of us. This is because through evolution we have indirectly 
experienced many dangerous situations with snakes involved. When it comes to 
information systems we lack this experience. While a snake can scare us without 
carrying a note saying: “if you are a human being, I might be a threat to you”, the 
threats connected to information systems must be documented in a clear and 
understandable way for us to see them. Documenting threats in a clear and 
understandable way is what threat modelling is all about “. [1] 
 
The CORAS framework for model-based risk analysis (MBRA) contains a 
graphical language for document threats and unwanted incidents. An example of 
how the CORAS UML profile can be used is given in Figure D 1. 
 
 




Unwanted incidents diagrams consist of threats and unwanted incidents. The threat 
scenario may be caused by a weakness, vulnerability, in the system that the treat 
agent can exploit. The threat agent (e.g. eavesdropper or malicious person) present 
the active part of the threat and the threat scenario is behaviour of the threat agent. 
A threat scenario may lead to an unwanted incident. The threats and the unwanted 
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incidents are related to the assets they threat. In this case the threat agent is an 
eavesdropper that could get illegal access to data by listening to the network. This 
arises because of the lack of encryption in the network. This threat could cause an 
unwanted incident of disclosure of confidential information. The risk could easily 
be treated by encrypting the communication. 
1.4 Report structure  
This section presents the report structure. It is meant as a help to the reader and 
summarises the main points from each chapter. 
 
CHAPTER 1: Establish the purpose and goal for the analysis and contains 
information about the participants and meetings completed. The chapter introduces 
the reader to the CORAS framework for MBRA. 
 
CHAPTER 2: Documents and describes the analysis context which includes a 
description of the analysis target, the asset related to the target and risk evaluation 
criteria used later in the report.  
 
CHAPTER 3: Documents the result of the risk identification process. It Categorise 
the unwanted incidents scenarios into appropriate sections. 
 
CHAPTER 4: Documents the estimated unwanted incidents.  
 
CHAPTER 5: Documents the evaluation of the risks and gives the result of which 
risk that should be treated.  
 
CHAPTER 6: Suggest a solution to the risk decided to treat.  
 
CHAPTER 7: Gives a short conclusion with suggested further work. 
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Chapter 2                                                  
Context identification 
The aim of this process was to identify the context of the analysis; what was the 
purpose of this analysis? What do we want to protect? Which risk level are we 
willing to accept? This includes describing the environment, the target, identify 
assets and specify risk acceptance criteria. There were provided a correct and 
complete description of the AGRESSO POF and its environment. The description 
is presented in the form of pictures, models and text. 
2.1 Description of the target of analysis 
The target of the analysis is the PunchOut process in the ABW (Agresso business 
world) system. Agresso’s goal is to create a more flexible PunchOut solution. The 
new design should give room to accommodate customers need. PunchOut is the 
process of sending the requisition from AGRESSO Self Service to the marketplace 
and the marketplace replying on these messages. The goal is to improve the 
security in the functionality. Table D 4 gives a short target description including the 
analysis client, target functionalities and analysis quality aspects. 
 
Table D 4 Target of Analysis table 
Category Value 
Target The AGRESSO POF, web application. The process when 
transferring (punch-out) messages between an AGRESSO Self 
Service and a marketplace and reply on the message.  
Client Agresso R&D 
Service/Function PunchOut  
Go shopping (the process of enter the marketplace to shop)  
PostBack (the process when marketplace post back the message 
to AGRESSO) 
Retrieve shopping (the user loads the message into the browser)  
Delete purchase (the user deletes a purchase)  
Approve purchase (the user sends the requisition to a approver)  
Quality aspects Client authentication, server authentication, confidentiality, 
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In the following there will be described the role of the AGRESSO POF in a typical 
Agresso network, who has legal access to the functionality, communication 




2.1.1 AGRESSO PunchOut in a network 
ABW consist of a windows application named AGRESSO Smart Client and a web 
application named AGRESSO Self Service as illustrated in Figure D 2 The 
AGRESSO POF could only be accessed from the AGRESSO Self Service 
application. If an Agresso user wishes to use AGRESSO through internet the user 
has to connect the Self Service through a VPN (virtual private network) connection.  
 
Figure D 2 Simplified Agresso network 
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2.1.2 The AGRESSO PO process 
PunchOut is the process of transferring message between AGRESSO and the 
marketplace as illustrated in Figure D 3. The user pushes “go shopping” to enter the 




Figure D 3 Overview AGRESSO PunchOut functionality 
 
 
The AGRESSO PO was divided into three processes:  
 
 Go shopping: The process of enter the marketplace to shop. User push “Go 
shopping” button.  
 PostBack: The process when marketplace posts back the message to 
AGRESSO.  
 Retrieve shopping: The user loads the message into AGRESSO (requisition 
site) from the message inbox. 
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Figure D 4 Overview AGRESSO PunchOut 
 
 
A more detailed description of the three processes is presented in the following 
sections.  
2.2 Identification and valuation of assets 
This section gives a description of the assets relevant to the AGRESSO POF. The 
process included finding what is of value in the target of analysis from an enterprise 
view, the Agresso Company, viewpoint. The Agresso assets that are related the 
AGRESSO POF. 
2.2.1 Assets 
Assets are something with value that is vulnerable for Agresso if it loses value (e.g. 
the asset Agresso clients, if Agresso loses clients then Agresso will lose income 
thus Agresso client is something valuable for Agresso) 
 
The assets relevant for the AGRESSO POF are given in Table D 5. It was identified 
three main assets to use during the risk identification: 
 Agresso Reputation  
 Information  
 Usability 
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Table D 5 Asset Table 
Asset ID Description Category 
A1 Agresso’s reputation in the market. A loss in 
reputation will affect customers trust and 
Agresso may lose customers 
Agresso Reputation 
A2 Misuse of information may cause damage on 
customers’ data and confidential 
information. It would put Agresso in a bad 
view and could affect trust and loss of 
customers. 
Information 




In additional to the three main asset there exist asset related to these. 
This model gives an overview of possible assets in AGRESSO POF and the 
relation between them. 
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Figure D 5 Assets 
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2.3 Risk evaluation criteria 
In order to decide the level of risk to the identified threats and unwanted incidents 
there were defined risk evaluation criteria, given in Table D 6. It defines the 
frequency, consequence and risk values. The frequency, consequence and risk 
values are added to the risk matrix. 
  
The risk value is decided by the incidents consequence and frequency values, and is 
used to decide what loss in asset value Agresso can tolerate. 
 
  
Table D 6 Value Definition Table 
Type Domain Allowed values Description 
Frequency occurence/time very rare, rare, usual Very rare: 1:year  
Rare: 1/4:year  
Usual: 1:week 
Consequence NOK low, medium, high Low: 100 000, No 
noticeable effect  
Medium: 1 000 000, 
Loss of potential 
customers  
High: 10 000 000, 
National effect 
Risk value  low, medium, high Low: accept  
Medium: Monitor  
High: Treat 
 
The risk matrix in Table D 7 consists of the frequency, consequence and risk values 
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Table D 7 Risk Matrix 
 Frequency 
 Very rare:  
1 : Year 
Rare: 
¼ : Year 
Usual: 
1 : Week 
Low: 
100 000 NOK, 
no significant 
effect 
Low Low Low 
Medium: 
1 000 0000 
NOK, loss of 
potential 
customers 




10 000 000 
NOK, national 
effect 
High High High 
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Chapter 3                                                       
Risk identification 
This section documents the risk found during the risk identification process. The 
goal of this process is to identify threats to assets. During the process there were 
used a known risk analysis method Hazard and Operability Analysis (HazOp). Two 
risk identification meetings were accomplished, organised as structured 
brainstorming. In the brainstorming session the system documentation of the three 
main processes in the AGRESSO PO were handed as input together with 
guidewords and questions (see end of this report). 
3.1 Identification of threats and unwanted incidents 
During the brainstorming session the analysis team identified possible threats and 
unwanted incidents. The incidents were given frequency values assigned by the 
analysis team (presented in Chapter 4).  
 The incidents are logical structured. Similar risks are put together and 
described. The identified threats and unwanted incidents are categorised and 
described in a HazOp table and a more detailed description is given with CORAS 
own graphical language (introduced in section 1.3). The HazOp table describes the 
threat agent, unwanted incidents and vulnerabilities to each possible risk. 
 
3.1.1 Exploitation of available information scenarios 
In organisations much information circulates. Some information is confidential and 
need protection. A malicious person can exploit the available information. This 
section describes the exploitation of available information unwanted incidents 
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R11 Human threat, 
insider 
The insider gets the DB 
password and username. Can 










R15 Human threat, 
eavesdropper, 
competitor 
An eavesdropper listens to the 
traffic between AGRESSO 
and the MP and gets valuable 
information. 
Access to MP login 
information, get access to 
contract data. Media publicity 
about expensive contracts that 
could harm Agresso. Exposing 
of contracts. Information that 
could harm the reputation. 
Access to DB password, 
overwrites/destroys data  
Intercept confidential 
information. Could cause 
overview of shopping patterns 











R11 scenario:  The R11 scenario is given in Figure 6. The scenario shows what 
could happen if Agresso has a weak organisation policy. Most of the attacks in an 
organisation are caused by an insider. If a malicious insider gets the DB login 
information he could do a lot of damage on the system. Weak organisation policy 
of who should have the DB login information would increase the chance of 
information getting into wrong hands.  
 
Figure D 6 R11 
 
 
R15 scenario:   R 15 llustrates an eavesdropper/competitor listens to the 
communication between the MP and Agresso. Packets are transmitted from the 
Marketplace to AGRESSO during a shopping session. If the communication is not 
secured packets are vulnerable for attacks. Scenarios that may occur:  
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 Eavesdroppers can listen to the network and read confidential information.  
 Agresso competitors could exploit this vulnerability and create media 
publicity about expensive contracts etc.  
 A supplier can get overview of the shopping patterns and adjust the supply to 
gain profit.   
 An eavesdropper can also change the information in the packets transmitted 
between AGRESSO and the Marketplace.  
 
Figure D 7 R15 
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3.1.2 Unavailable or slow service scenarios 
The system usability is important for a user. A slow system or not accessible 
system is not a good system. A variety of attacks can result in the loss of or 
reduction in availability. This section describes identified incident that could cause 





















R2 System threat Shopping basket is too big. 
Could not post back 











R3 System threat Inbox to full. Information 
will not be saved/ Inbox 
becomes too large.  
The searching time gets to 
long. Results in slow 
service that will affect the 
usability. 
Too many purchases. Top 
Gen will not be able to 
load purchases when the 
user pushes “retrieve 
shopping”. The user will 
not be able to delete. 
Lack of error 
message. No 
inbox 
cleaning.  No 
limit on how 
many 
purchases the 
user can load. 
Usability 





Large messages are posted 
to the server. Causes a DoS 
attack. The service gets 
unavailable or slow. 






R5 System threat, 
performance 
Too many users using 
PunchOut. The system 
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R6 Attacker Dos attack.  The system is 
shutting down; the users 
lose work and have to do 






R7 System threat  The system is shutting 
down, the users lose work 
and have to do the work 
over again: 
Timeout (the session times 
out) 








PunchOut can not be 















R2 and R3 scenario: R2 and R3 shows two incidents that would cause in 
unavailable or slow service. The PunchOut functionality has lacks that may affect 
the usability. The lack of shopping limit in the PunchOut functionality makes it 
possible for the user to send large and unwieldy packets to AGRESSO. This may 
result in that the PunchOut service will either reject it or the service is getting slow.   
Another scenario of slow service is if the inbox is full or large. This could cause 
slow and unavailable service. If the user wishes to upload purchases the time of 
getting the purchases could take a while. The lack of inbox indexing could cause in 
long searching time.  
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Figure D 8 R2 and R3 
 
 
R5 scenario: The R5 scenario demonstrates what could happen if the Agresso 
customer have weak infrastructure. The infrastructure may not be able to handle 
several purchases. If shopping basket message is too big or several users post back 
messages to the system at the same time, the service could be slow. This will cause 
in a slow service and TopGen will not be able to load purchases. There could also 
be too many users using PunchOut that could in worst case cause a system break 
down.  
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Figure D 9 R5 
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R6 and R7 scenario: Unavailable or slow service could have influence at the users 
work. If the user shops in a Marketplace and post back the shopping basket to 
AGRESSO while the service becomes unavailable the work will be lost. A session 
timeout or a web server reboot could cause this action.  
Another scenario is a Denial of service (DoS). An attacker could send large and 
heavy packets to the server. A possible DoS attack is the known SYN attack.  
 
Figure D 10 R6 and R7 
 
 
R8 scenario:  In addition to R5 the Agresso customer infrastructure may not 
support PunchOut at all. It could be that the customer has strict security that does 
not allow PunchOut to enables. It will result in unavailable PunchOut service.  
 
Figure D 11 R8 
 
 
R12 scenario: As illustrated inFigure14, an insider or hacker could also affect the 
usability by sending large and many packets to the service and cause a DoS attack. 
This causes a slow or a not accessible system at all. Then authenticated users are 
not able to use the service.  
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3.1.3 Pipeline and configuration error 
This section describes the incidents identified pursuant to the pipeline and 














How? What is the 
incident? 




R4 System threat, 
pipeline 
creator 
Pipeline error. The 
pipeline creator writes 
incorrect and bad code.  
Error in MP URL. The 
user gets redirected to 
another MP or no side. 
AGRESSO could not read 
the PostBack message. 
Wrong format in the 
PostBack message. 
MP sends a PostBack 
message to AGRESSO. 
The message is placed in 
the wrong inbox. 










R10 Human threat, 
AGRESSO 
administrator 
The administrator gives 
wrong information in the 
configuration file 
Error in MP URL, the user 
access wrong MP or no 
MP at all.  
Error in user information. 
Error in the 
configuration, 
master file. The 
connection is not 
tested. 
Usability 
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The users can not access 
MP 
Error in authentication 
information.  
R13 Human threat, 
insider 
An insider changes the 
replaces the pipeline 
components with own 
made components. The 
components could harm 
the system. 
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R4, R10 and R13 scenario: These scenarious presents the incidents of human 
threats to the AGRESSO POF. Agresso adjust that other than the developers can 
create their own pipeline components in the POF. Insiders and pipeline creator 
could misuse their authority to change the pipeline components with malicious 
code e.g. virus (R13). R4 illustrates the lack of Pipeline validation. Since there do 
not exist any form of pipeline validation pipeline creator could create errors in the 
pipeline components.  
The AGRESSO administrator configures the PO. The administrator decides who 
should have access and what Marketplace to connect. If the administrator adds 
wrong configuration settings the PO will not work properly (R10).  
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Figure D 13 R4, R10 and R13 
 
 
3.1.4 Manipulation of PostBack message 
The Agresso user post back messages from the Marketplace to AGRESSO. This 
operation is vulnerable since AGRESSO is connected to the Marketplace internet 
page. This section involves the incidents identified related to events of when a user 
posting back a message from the Marketplace to AGRESSO. 
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R17 Human threat, 
attacker 
An attacker steals a users 
TCP session and uses the 
session to send several 
purchases to AGRESSO. 
Top Gen will not be able to 
load purchases because it is 
too many. The user could 
not delete the purchases 
because Top Gen will not 







R17 scenario: The attacker could use the session to send several or large purchases 
to AGRESSO. Since there is a lack of purchase limit the attacker (or an Agresso 
user) could send a large packet to AGRESSO. This could cause in unavailable 
PunchOut service.   
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3.1.5  Mapping error 
When using AGRESSO there occur several mappings. It could be language 
mapping, (translation of a language) or unit code mapping (purchase mapping). 





















R16 Human threat, 
insider 
The AGRESSO mappings 
are not updated. Error in 








R16 scenario: R26 shows the incidents of mapping error in PunchOut functionality. 
There are two mapping scenarios could occur. If the purchases the Agresso post 
back to AGRESSO has wrong unit codes, it will be rejected and not be able to load 
the purchases into AGRESSO. The other scenario could be if there exist translation 
errors. Then the user will probably misunderstand the messages because they are 
written in another language than the user expects it to be written in.  
 
Figure D 15 R16 
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Chapter 4                                                           
Risk estimation 
The identified risks were given consequence and frequency values. This chapter 
gives the result of these estimated values.  
 
There was a lack of logs and documentation that could help decide the frequency 
values, thus the values are based on the teams experience and logic. The values 
considered all the AGRESSO applications installed in Norway. 
4.1 Consequence and frequency estimation 
Table D 8 table adds consequence and frequency values to the unwanted incidents 
found in the risk identification process. 
 
Table D 8 Consequence and Frequency Table 




R1 A2 Malicious person hacking 
AGRESSO 
high Rare 
R2 A3 Shopping basket to big low Rare 
R3 A3 Full inbox low Very rare 
R4 A3 Pipeline error low Usual 
R5 A3 Unavailable service low Rare 
R6 A3 High traffic on the server, user 
loses work. 
low Rare 
R7 A3 Service is shutting down low Usual 
R8 A3 User not able to shop on MP low very rare 
R9 A2 Manipulation of post back 
message 
medium Rare 
R10 A3 Error in configuration file low very rare 
R11 A2 Unauthorised change in the 
database 
medium Usual 
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R12 A3 Authenticated users not able to use 
service 
low Rare 
R13 A2 Insider change pipeline 
components 
medium very rare 
R14 A2 Malicious person get valuable 
information about AGRESSO 
high Usual 
R15 A1 Eavesdropper listens to the 
network and get confidential 
information 
low Rare 
R16 A3 Mapping error low Usual 
R17 A3 Top Gen not able to load purchase medium Usual 
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Chapter 5                                              
Risk evaluation 
In order to find risks to treat there were assigned risk values to each risk. The risk 
values are determined from the consequence and frequency values given in Table D 
8. 
 
Based on the result from the consequence and frequency estimation each risk was 
assigned a risk value. From the value of definition table the risk level were 
prioritised.   
 
Table D 9 present the risks added to the risk matrix. 
 
Table D 9 Risk Evaluation Table 
Risk ID Risk Value Risk Priority 
R1 High Treat 
R2 Low Accept 
R3 Low Accept 
R4 Low Accept 
R5 Low Accept 
R6 Low Accept 
R7 Low Accept 
R8 Low Accept 
R9 Medium Monitor 
R10 Low Accept 
R11 Medium Monitor 
R12 Low Accept 
R13 Low Accept 
R14 High Treat 
R15 Low Accept 
R16 Low Accept 
R17 Medium Monitor 
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Table 10 displays the risk added into the risk matrix. It indicates that R1 and R14 
are high risk and should be treated.  
 
Table D 10 Risk matrix included the evaluated risks 
Frequency 
 Very Rare 
1 : Year 
Rare 








R3,R10,R8 R2,R5,R6,R12,R15 R4,R7,R16 
Medium:  













 R1 R14 
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Chapter 6                                              
Risk treatment 
The main goal of the risk treatment is to reduce either consequence or frequency 
values of the risks. In a treatment diagram the treatment specified as a use case 
addressing the treatment to an unwanted incident. 
 
There is suggested treatment to the risks of medium and high risk value as given in 
Table D 9 (Chapter 5). The first section describes the treatment in a treatment table. 
The following section describes each of the treatments with CORAS’s specific 
graphical language. 
6.1 Risk treatment table 
The risk treatment table describes the treatment and the treatment effect of the risk 
decided to treat. 
 











R11 Apply strict 
access policy 







of misuse of 
information. 
The insider gets the 
DB password and 
username. Can change 
almost everything in 
the database. 
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The insider gets the 
DB password and 
username. Can change 
almost everything in 
the database. 
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6.2 Treatment Risk 11 
 
Treatment R11:  The R11 identified two vulnerabilities missing organisation policy 
and lack of DB protection. A solution to the missing policy could be to apply strict 
access policy e.g. use known standards to apply good access policy to the 
organisation.  
In order to protect the DB there are several actions that can be applied. In the 
following some are listed: 
 Enforce integrity (e.g. in MS SQL entity integrity, domain integrity, 
referential integrity and user defined integrity)  
 Avoid using the guest account  
 Access control. Use windows authentication 
 Database encryption 
 Auditing the DB 
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Chapter 7                                    
Conclusion 
The aim of the analysis was to find potential security issues in AGRESSO POF and 
thereby improve it. In order to find potential risks we had to decide the elements of 
value (assets). The viewpoint of the analysis was Agresso, thus the assets were 
determined from the Agresso organisations viewpoint. There were three main 
assets considered during the process: 
 




In the risk identification process the goal was to find potential risk that could cause 
a loss of these assets. There were accomplished a structured brainstorming to find 
the risks. In the brainstorming there were handed out checklist and question with 
intention to assist the analysis team in finding risks. The AGRESSO POF is divided 
into three parts, each examined in the brain storming process: 
 
 Go shopping 
 PostBack  
 Retrieve shopping 
 
When the risks were identified, each was estimated with consequence and 
frequency value. Since there did not exist any information (e.g. logs) of attacks etc. 
the team used their own experience and logic to estimate the risks.  
 
Conducting to the Agressos’ viewpoint two risks of high value was found: 
R1: Malicious person receives database information and uses this information to 
log into the database and destroy information. 
R14: Malicious person can use the error information to get valuable information 
about AGRESSO system. 
 
It is difficult to give a good solution to any of these risks. They are both general and 
do not describe in detail how it could happen.  
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The AGRESSO POF itself is not a critical part of Agresso, thus with an Agresso 
viewpoint there will not be any high risks of interest for the AGRESSO POF.  
 
To summarise this analysis could be more directed to the AGRESSO POF and not 
as much the Agresso organisation. Thus it is suggested to conduct an upgraded 
meeting. Suggestion for further work to improve the analysis result follows.  
 
Further work 
In order to upgrade the analysis the analysis will be reviewed. The aim is to find 
more threats related to the AGRESSO POF. In this case the viewpoint will be 
AGRESSO POF. As input to the process the result of this analysis will be given.  
 
The process will include extra meeting with new assets and viewpoint. It could be 
performed an actual test in the test environment. Recommended points of interest in 
the new process are: 
 
 Performance 
 Authentication handling 
 Session handling 
 Error handling 
 Information flow. 
 
This process will be a more practical. Tools like fiddler11 would be used.    
                                                 
11
 http://www.fiddlertool.com 
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Definitions 
 
Frequency: A measure of the rate of occurrence of an event 
expressed as the number of occurrences of an event in a 
given time. (Likelihood and Probability). The frequency 
of a loss in Asset. [2]  
 
Consequence: The outcome of an event expressed qualitatively or 
quantitatively, being a loss, injury, disadvantage or gain. 
There may be a range of possible outcomes associated 
with an event. [2]  
 
Risk: The chance of something happening that will have an 
impact upon objectives. It is measured in terms of 
consequence and frequency. A risk is an unwanted 
incident that has been assigned consequence and 
frequency values. The level of risk is decided by the 
consequence and frequency values. [2] 
 
HazOp: Hazard and operability study. It is a technique for 
identifying and analyzing the hazards and operational 
concerns of a system. [2] 
 
Threat: A potential cause of an unwanted event, which may 
result in harm to a system or organisation and its assets 
 
Risk analysis:  Systematic process to understand the nature of and to 
deduce the level of risk [3]. 
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HazOp questions 
Generelt: 
Hvem kan såre oss? Hva er motivasjon og mål?  
Hvor mye kunnskap har de om systemet? 
Bruker feil: 
Kan brukeren gjøre feil? 
Hva skjer hvis brukeren gjør en feil? 
Kan bruker slette noe han/hun ikke skal slette? 
Systemfeil: 
Gir systemet unødvendig mye informasjon? F.eks feilmeldinger.  
Kan informasjonen utnyttes av en intrenger? 
Hvordan er systemets ytelse? 
Hva skjer hvis det er stor pågang mot siden? Dos attack 
Hvordan er feilhåndteringene? 
Hvordan er logikken i systemet? 
Hvordan er informasjons flyten? Er det unødvendig informasjons flyt? 
Forsinkelse 
Programeringsfeil 
Hvordan håndteres autentiseringen? 
Krav fra kunden: 
Påvirker PunchOut kundenes krav? 
Hva med kundenes infrastruktur (brannmurer, sikkerhetsnivået)? 
Er det noen krav fra kundene 




Hva om MP URL er feil? 
Er redirection til en annen side mulig 
Hvordan er autentiseringen til MP? 
Hva skjer når session utløper? 
 
PunchBack: 
Kan handlekurven manipuleres? 
Kan uønskede hendelser oppstå gjennom MP kontakt med andre servere? 
Hva om PunchBack ligger i et annet application domain? 
Input sjekking? Hva om noen sender en stor pakke? 
Har formatet noe å si for kundenes infrastruktur?  
Hvordan håndteres autentiseringen? Er det noen svakheter med autentiseringen?  
Falske post? Redirection? 
Hva om inboxen er for full? 
Kan man poset meldinger fra andre enn MP? E-mail f.eks? 
Hente innkjøp: 
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Sortere på dato 
Slette funksjonen 
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HazOp guidewords 
Session hijack: En hacker overtar sesjonen mellom to maskiner 
Tampering attack: F.eks endre parametere i en session, endre konfigurasjons 
settinger, rediricte til en annen side, endre brukers rettigheter 
Replay attack: En angriper som gjør et angrep på nettverket f.eks lytter på linja 
og snapper opp passordet for siden å logge seg inn som en annen, eller 
forsinke trafikken (DOS angrep) 
Integrity: Beskytte mot uønsket endring av data. Data ikke blir endret av 
uatoriserte 
Confidentiality: Informasjon ikke er synliggjort for uvedkommede 
Availability: data, ressurser e.l er tilgjengelig når en autorisert enhet trenger det.’ 
Authentication: Brukeren er den han utgir seg for å være 
SQL injection: Intrenger/bruker kan manipulere databasen 
Bufferoverflow: oppstår når man prøver lagre mer data i en buffer enn den er 
beregnet til å kunne lagre 
Avsløring (åpne for noe som har vært skjult) 
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Analysis target 
 
Access points to the AGRESSO POF 
 
When Agresso users should use PunchOut they enter the AGRESSO requisition 
site. There are several ways to access the requisition site and use the AGRESSO 
POF. The users are connected to certain roles in AGRESSO.  
 
Figure 26..displays different possible access points to the requisition site:  
Security/infrastructure administrator: network configuration, administrate the 
network.  
 
 AGRESSO installation contractor: Installs and configure AGRESSO  
 AGRESSO administrator: Creates users and roles. Decides who could access 
Requisition and who approves the purchases. 
 AGRESSO user: Has access to AGRESSO POF.  
 Approver: Approves the purchases shopped by the AGRESSO user. 
 Marketplace (MP): Place where you can go shopping.  
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Communication between the AGRESSO PO components 
 
The AGRESSO POF consists of several components that each has different tasks in 
the PunchOut process. Figure 27..displays which components that communicates 
during the AGRESSO PO session.  
 
Component description:  
 
 PipelineManager: Gets the predefined pipeline components. 
 ErrorHandler: Handles the error in the pipliene process and error with the 
pipeline.  
 MessageInbox: Contains the purchases that are being posted back from the 
marketplace.  
 RequisitionSite: It is the interface that communicates with the user.  
 Marketplace (MP): External site where the user shop (e.g. IBX). 
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